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Horwitz: Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory

SANTA CLARA REVISITED: THE DEVELOPMENT OF
CORPORATE THEORY*
MORTON J. HoRwITz**
I.

INTRODUCTION

The 1886 decision of the United States Supreme Court in Santa Clara Co. v.
Southern Pacific Railroad' has always been puzzling and controversial. From the
time Progressive constitutional historians began to mount their attack on the Supreme
Court after the Lochner decision in 1905,2 the Santa Clara case became one of
the prominent symbols of the subservience of the Supreme Court during the Gilded
3
Age to the interests of big business.
The Santa Clara case held that a corporation was a person under the fourteenth amendment, and thus entitled to its protection. That holding has been
affirmed by the Supreme Court dozens of times, notwithstanding a famous announcement by Justices Black and Douglas in 1949 that recent historical writing
had led them to conclude that the Santa Clara case was wrongly decided." In our
own time, in First NationalBank v. Bellotti5 a five-to-four majority of the Supreme
Court treated the Santa Clara case as if it in effect had already decided that corporations, like individuals, were entitled to the protection of the first amendment."
As far back as 1925, the Supreme Court assumed that the free speech clause was
incorporated into the "liberty" protected by the fourteenth amendment. In Bellotti
the majority spoke as if it were simply axiomatic that the Santa Clara case settled
the view that the free speech doctrine had been extended to corporations.'
For such a momentous decision, the opinion in the Santa Clara case is
disquietingly brief-just one short paragraph-and totally without reasons or precedent. Indeed, it was made without argument of counsel. It declared:
The court does not wish to hear argument on the question whether the provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which forbids a State to
* A version of this Article was delivered at the West Virginia University College of Law as an
annual Edward G. Donley Memorial Lecture. © 1986 by the author.
** Charles Warren Professor of the History of American Law, Harvard University. B.A., C.C.N.Y.,
1959; Ph.D., Harvard University, 1964; J.D., Harvard University, 1967.
Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
2 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (state regulations limiting the hours of employment
in bakeries violates the right to freedom of contract guaranteed by U.S. Const. 14th amend.).
I See Graham, Justice Field and the Fourteenth Amendment, 52 YALE L.J. 851, 853 (1943);
Graham, The "Conspiracy Theory" of the Fourteenth Amendment, 47 YALE L.J. 371, 403 (1938).
See also C. BEARD, CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN HISTORY: 1877-1913 208, 210-13 (1936).

' Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77 (1938); Wheeling Steel v. Glander, 337
U.S. 562, vacated, U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 951, rev'd, 337 U.S. 951 (1949).
' First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978), reh'g denied 438 U.S. 907 (1978).
6 Id. at 780 n.15.
' Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
' Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 778 n.14 (referring to Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion at 822). See
id. at 780 n.15.
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deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, applies
to these corporations. We are all of opinion that it does.'

Can it be that so casual a declaration as this did in fact represent a major
controversial step in American constitutional history? Did the decision actually represent a significant departure from American constitutional jurisprudence? I think
not. The Santa Clara decision was not thought of as an innovation but instead
was regarded as following a line of cases going back almost seventy years to the
Dartmouth College case.'"
But my interest in the Santa Clara case extends far beyond the question of
whether it was consistent with previous constitutional decisions. Whatever the
Supreme Court justices had in mind, the case is usually thought to express a new
theory of the corporation or, as it soon became fashionable to call it, a new theory
of corporate personality. The Santa Clara case is thus asserted to be a dramatic
example of judicial personification of the corporation, which, it is argued, radically
enhanced the position of the business corporation in American law." There can
be no doubt that recent cases like Bellotti, which recognizes a constitutional right
of corporations to spend money to influence elections, have contributed enormously
to the political and economic power of big business.
But the question remains whether the Santa Claracase did in fact proceed from
a theory that the corporate entity was no different from the individual in its constitutional entitlements. To answer this question, I will attempt a long excursion
into the history of the theories of the corporation that were prevalent when the
Santa Clara case was decided. I hope to show, first, that the so-called "natural
entity" or "real entity" theory of the corporation that the Santa Claracase is supposed to have adopted was nowhere to be found in American legal thought when
the case was decided; second, that those who argued for the corporation as well
as Supreme Court Justice Stephen Field, who decided in favor of the corporation
in two elaborate circuit court opinions below,' 2 clearly had no conception of a natural
entity theory of the corporation; and, third, that when the natural entity theory
emerged about a decade later, it was only then gradually absorbed into the Santa
Clara precedent to establish dramatically new constitutional protections for
corporations.
So initially, I wish to show not only that the real meaning of the Santa Clara
decision has not been understood, but also that it did not express the pro-big-business

theory of the corporation that only came to fruition shortly before the First World
War.

Santa Clara, 118 U.S. at 396.

° Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
Graham, supra note 3, 52 YALE L.J. at 853.
2 Santa Clara v. Southern Pac. R.R., 18 F. 385, 402-05 (C.C. Cal. 1883); San Mateo v. Southern
Pac. R.R., 13 F. 722, 746-48 (1882) (companion cases).
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Yet, finally, this focus on the Santa Clara case and on the history of corporate
theory is designed to explore a still more difficult question about the role of legal
theory in legal decision. For almost forty years after 1890, American jurists, like
their German, French, and English counterparts, were preoccupied with the theory
of the corporation, or, as it was then frequently called, with corporate personality.
Then the issue suddenly vanished from controversy. The last great analysis of the
question, which is sometimes thought to have permanently put it to rest, appeared
in a 1926 Yale Law Journalarticle,' 3 by the philosopher John Dewey. Writing in
sympathy with the powerful contemporaneous Legal Realist attack on "conceptualism,"'" Dewey sought to show that theories of corporate personality were infinitely manipulable and that at different times the same theories had been used
both to expand and to limit not only corporate but trade union powers. Let me
quote Dewey's argument. "Each theory" of group personality he maintained "has
been used to serve . . . opposing ends."
[Ilt has been employed both to make the state the Supreme and culminating
personality in a hierarchy, to make it but primus inter pares, and to reduce it to
merely one among many .... Corporate groups less than the state have had real
personality ascribed to them, both in order to make them more amenable to liability, as in the case of trade-unions, and to exalt their dignity and vital power, against
external control .... The group personality theory has been asserted both as a check
upon what was regarded as anarchic and dissolving individualism, to set up something
more abiding and worthful than a single human being, and to increase the power
and dignity of the single being as over against the state.' 5

There are very few discussions of corporate personality after Dewey. The Legal
Realists in general had succeeded in persuading legal thinkers that highly abstract
and general legal conceptions were simply part of what Felix Cohen, quoting von
Jhering, derisively called "the heaven of legal concepts."' 6 Only more concrete
statements of functional relations, Cohen argued, were useful in deciding legal
questions.
In our own time, the debate over concepts had revived once more within the
Critical Legal Studies Movement, where one dominant trend had been to demonstrate
the indeterminacy of concepts.' 7 The issue is whether any abstract conception"freedom" or "security" or "rights" are often used as examples-has any entailment in terms of more concrete legal doctrines or rules.' 8
By contrast, I will argue that most important controversial legal abstractions
" Dewey, The HistoricalBackground of CorporateLegal Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 655 (1926).
" Fuller, American Legal Realism, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 429 (1934).
" Dewey, supra note 13, at 669-70.
" Cohen, TranscendentalNonsense and the FunctionalApproach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935).
" See, e.g., Dalton, An Essay in Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997, 1006-07
(1985); Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1731-38
(1976); Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1, 9-25 (1984);
Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561, 568-70 (1983).
" Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO LAW REV. 205 (1979).
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do have determinate legal or political significance. In the jargon of the current
Critical Legal Studies debate, I wish to deny that legal conceptions are infinitely
"flippable" and instead to insist that they do have "tilt" or influence in determining outcomes. Thus, for example, I wish to dispute Dewey's conclusion that particular conceptions of corporate personality were just as easily used to limit as to
enhance corporate power. Instead, I hope to show that, for example, the rise of
a "natural entity" theory of the corporation was a major factor in legitimating
big business and that none of the other theoretical alternatives could provide as
much sustenance to newly organized concentrated enterprise.
I do not wish to be understood to disassociate myself from those brilliant critical
or Legal Realist attacks on legal reasoning. 19 The central thrust of the Realist legacy
to which we are all still indebted ultimately derives from Holmes' classical statement, "General propositions do not decide concrete cases." 2 Holmes as well as
John Dewey and Felix Cohen after him were attacking the formalist claim that
one could deductively and without discretion reason from a general concept to a
particular application. As a matter of legal logic their attack on formalism continues to be as powerful today as it was fifty years ago. But their attempt to discredit
the then orthodox claim to a non-political, non-discretionary mode of legal reasoning led them to ignore the obvious fact that when abstract conceptions are used
in specific historical contexts they have more limited meanings and more specific
argumentative functions. We have spent too much effort repeating the demonstrations of the indeterminacy of concepts in a logical vacuum; but not enough time
trying to show that in particular contexts the choice of one theory over another
is not random or accidental because history and usage have limited their deepest
meanings and applications.

II.
A.

THE SANTA CLARA CASE IN CONTEXT

The Real Meaning of the Santa Clara Decision

The Santa Clara case, along with several companion cases, came to the United
States Supreme Court from California.' They presented the question whether the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment barred California from taxing corporate property-in this case railroad property-differently from individual
property.
These California tax cases were clearly regarded as important and momentous
events in giving meaning to the newly enacted fourteenth amendment. Above all,
they represented another effort mounted by business interests after their narrow
"

Cohen, The EthicalBasis of Legal Criticism, 41 YALE L.J. 201, 215-19 (1931); Dewey, Logical

Method and Law, 10 CORNELL L. REv. 17 (1924).
20 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 76 (1905).
" San Mateo, 13 F. 745; Sacramento v. Central Pac. R.R., 18 F. 385 (1883) (for taxes of 1982);
California v. Northern Ry., 18 F. 385 (1883); California v. Central Pac. R.R., 18 F. 385 (1883); California
v. Southern Pac. R.R., 18 F. 285 (1883); Santa Clara, 18 F. 385.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol88/iss2/5
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failure to get the Supreme Court to broadly construe the fourteenth amendment
in the Slaughterhous Cases.22 In that decision, Justice Samuel Miller, speaking for a five man majority not only offered an extremely narrow contruction of
the "privileges and immunities" clause but he also construed the "equal protection
clause" as limited to protecting the status of recently freed slaves. In dissent, Justice
Stephen Field, who argued for a much more expansive definition of each of the
provisions of the fourteenth amendment,
sought, in effect, to create a general federal
3
charter of constitutional rights.
The central issue in the Slaughterhousecase was whether the fourteenth amendment had radically altered the constitutional relationship between the states and
the federal government. Justice Miller's "race theory" interpretation of the fourteenth amendment reinforced traditional fears of centralized power and was meant
to produce as little change in the federal balance of power as possible. By contrast,
Justice Field interpreted the fourteenth amendment as ratifying a dramatic alteration in the federal system as a consequence of the Civil War. 4
So when the California tax cases came before Justice Field, sitting on circuit,
the most basic and controversial question before him was whether it was possible
after the Slaughterhouse decision to construe the equal protection clause to extend
to non-race related questions. The central thrust of his decision was to continue
his battle, which was eventually successful, to expand the meaning of the amendment beyond the boundaries of race relations. Indeed, the real significance of the
Supreme Court's decision in Santa Clara may be precisely that it did go beyond
Justice Miller's Slaughterhouse effort to confine the scope of the equal protection
clause.
But our inquiry needs to focus elsewhere. How did Justice Field justify applying the equal protection clause to corporations when the language of the amendment was written to protect "persons."
Let us turn to the major argument in the brief on behalf of the corporation
before the United States Supreme Court. Written by the eminent California lawyer,
John Norton Pomeroy, the central argument was that the fourteenth amendment
protects the property rights not of some abstract corporate entity but rather of
the individual shareholders. As Pomeroy declared in his brief, provisions of state
and federal constitutions "apply

. .

.to private corporation, not alone because

such corporations are 'persons' within the meaning of that word, but because statutes
violating their prohibitionsin dealing with corporationsmust necessarily infringe
upon the rights of naturalpersons. In applying and enforcing these constitutional
guaranties, corporationscannot be separatedfrom the naturalpersons who compose them.'""
22 The

Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
Id. at 100-01.
14 Id. at 104-05.
' Argument for Defendant, San Mateo v. Southern Pac. R.R. Co., 116 U.S. 138 (1882) (collected in Cases and Points at 12 (available in Harvard Law School Library)) (emphasis in original).
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"That this conclusion must be true," Pomeroy argued, "appears from the
following principle:"
Whatever be the legal nature of a corporation as an artificial, metaphysical being,
separate and distinct from the individual members, and whatever distinctions the
common law makes, in carrying out the technical legal conception, between property
of the corporation and that of the individual members, still in applying the fundamental guaranties of the constitution, and in thus protecting rights of property,
these metaphysical and technical notions must give way to the reality. The truth
cannot be evaded that, for the purpose of protecting rights, the property of all
business and trading corporationsIS the property of the individual corporators.
A State act depriving a business corporation of its property without due process
of law, does in fact deprive the individual corporatorsof their property. In this
sense, and within the scope of these grand safeguards of private rights, there is
no real distinction between artificial persons or corporations, and natural persons. 6
Justice Field made exactly the same point in his circuit court opinion in the
companion San Mateo case: 27
Private corporations are it is, true artificial persons, but . . . they consist of

aggregations of individuals united for some legitimate business. . .. It would be
a most singular result if a constitutional provision intended for the protection of
every person against partial and discriminating legislation by the states, should cease
to exert such protection the moment the person becomes a member of a corporation. . . .On the contrary, we think that it is well established by numerous adjudications of the Supreme Court of the United States ...

that whenever a provi-

sion of the constitution, or of a law, guarantees to persons the enjoyment of property ...

the benefits of the provision extend to corporations, and that the courts

will always look beyond the name of the artificial being to the individuals whom
it represents.

The arguments of Pomeroy and Field are very different from a "real entity"
or "natural entity" theory of corporate personality that is often ascribed to the
Santa Claracase but which in fact only emerged some time after Santa Clara was
decided. Only this later theory can truly be said to personify the corporation and
treat it "just like individuals."
B.

Corporate Theory in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries

The theory of corporate personality attributed to the Santa Clara case-the
natural entity theory-was not really available at the time the case was decided.
This is clear after reviewing the American legal struggle to reconceptualize the corporation and the philosophical debates that arose in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century on the nature of corporate personality.
26 Id.
"

at 10 (emphasis in original).
San Mateo, 13 F. at 743-44.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol88/iss2/5
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1. The Philosophical Debates
There was a flood of writing on the subject of "corporate personality" in Germany, France, England, and America near the turn of the century. Why should
so metaphysical a subject, even if it attracted the speculative instincts of German
and French jurists, have appealed to the practical, earth-bound sensibilities of English
and American legal thinkers?
The intellectual history of the subject is quite clear. It was introduced into
Western thought by the publication of the German legal theorist Otto Gierke's great
1887 book on the history of associations in German legal theory.28 By 1900, there
were dozens of books written in French and German on "group personality," "corporate personality," or, as the French liked to call it, "moral personality." 29 It
became accessible to English and American thinkers after 1900 when Maitland,
the great English legal historian, published a portion of Gierke's work under the
title, Political Theories of the Middle Age,3" to which Maitland contributed an
introduction. Between 1900 and 1904 Maitland published four other articles on
the early history of corporations, culminating in his paper, "Moral Personality
and Legal Personality," 3' which sought to advance Gierke's idea that corporations were "real" or "natural" entities that possessed legal personalities deserving of recognition. In America, Gierke's work was first noticed by German-born
and trained University of Chicago Professor Ernst Freund, who in 1897 published
32
The Legal Nature of the Corporation.
If the intellectual history of the subject is relatively clear, the question remains
why so abstruse an inquiry should have engaged the attention of Anglo-American
lawyers? Maitland, wrongly it turns out, lamented the fact that the English could
not care less. He wondered, "Why we English people are not interested in a problem
that is being seriously discussed in many other lands," and his article, "Trust and
Corporation," 3 sought to explain how the Trust "enabled us to construct bodies
which were not technically corporations and which yet would be sufficiently protected
from the assaults of individualistic theory." 34
Americans, in fact, were especially receptive to questions involving group theory.
Even before Gierke was known or Maitland's writings had crossed the Atlantic,
American legal thinkers had begun to wrestle with the problem of conceptualizing
group personality, and, in particular, the corporation. Beginning in the 1890s they
too sought to develop a picture of the corporation as a "real" or "natural" entity

0.
0
30
"
'2

"

GIERKE, DAS DEUTSCHE GENOSSENSCHAFTSRECHT (1887).

For a good bibliography, see 4 R. POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 200-01 (1959) (unnumbered note).
0. GIERKE, POLITICAL THEORIES OF THE MIDDLE AGE (F.W. Maitland ed. 1900).

F.W. MAITLAND, COLLECTED PAPERS (H.A.L. Fisher ed. 1911).
E. FREUND, THE LEGAL NATURE OF CORPORATIONS (1897).

3 F.W. MAITLAND, supra note 31, at 321.
Id. at 317.
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as well as to explain or justify the inscrutable holding of the United States Supreme
Court in the Santa Clara case.
What united all of these inquiries, whether German, French, English, or
American, was the spectacular rise to prominence during the late nineteenth century of the business corporation as the dominant form of economic enterprise. In
1890, Justice Stephen Field estimated that three-quarters of the wealth of the United
States was controlled by corporations. 5 This growth in the corporate form of
economic enterprise presented essentially two fundamental challenges to traditional
Western legal theory. First, in all of these countries the corporation was treated
as a "legal fiction" or an "artifical entity" created by the state. Gierke and his
successors devoted themselves to showing that the corporation-indeed, group activity generally-was "real" and "natural," not "artifical" or "fictional." The
proponents of Realism ranged all the way from overt apologists for big business,
whose primary objective was to free the corporation from a theory that justified
special state regulation, to those who for a variety of reasons wished to attack
nineteenth century liberal individualism.
The challenge to individualism produced a second fundamental set of questions. On the continent, individualism was under attack, first, by romantic conservatives, who loathed the atomistic features of modern industrial life and yearned
for a return to a pre-commercial, organic society composed of medieval status and
hierarchies. 36 They were joined in their attacks by socialists who wished to transcend the anti-collectivist categories of liberal social and legal thought." While the
attack focused on the rise of corporations, it also sought to take account of the
recent prominence of labor unions and trade and professional associations.3" And
even Maitland, whose legal history was devoted to affirming the liberal vision of
individual property holding against the collectivist historians' search for pre-modern
forms of communal property, 39 promoted the real entity theory and sympathetically
regarded the trust as a fictional device covertly designed to evade "the assaults
of individualistic theory." 4 0

, See 1 S.

THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS

VI (lst ed. 1895).

(preface).
6

Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1083-90 (1980).

Laski, The Personalityof Associations, 29 HARv. L. REV. 404 (1916); See generally W.Y. ELLIOTr,
(1928).
" See R. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER: 1877-1920 (1967); Galambos, Technology, Political
Economy, and Professionalization:Central Themes of the OrganizationalSynthesis, 57 Bus. HIST. REV.
(1983); Galambos, The Emerging OrganizationalSynthesis in Modern American History, 44 Bus. HIST.
REV. (1970).
" I.P. VINOGRADOFF', OUTLINES OF HISTORICAL JURISPRUDENCE 147-48 (1920); White & Vann,
The Invention of English Individualism, 8 SOCIAL HISTORY 345, 352-54 (1983); D. SUGARMAN & G.R.
RUBIN, Towards a New History of Law and MaterialSociety in England, 1750-1914 in Law, Economy
and Society 28-30 (1984) (Rubin & Sugarman eds.)
" F.W. MAITLAND, supra note 30, at 317.
"

THE PRAGMATIC BASIS OF POLITICS
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The corporation, in short, was the most powerful and prominent example of
the emergence of non-individualistic or, if you will, collectivist legal institutions.
The artificial entity theory of the corporation, by contrast, sought to retain the
premises of what has been called "methodological individualism," that is, the view
that the only real starting point for political or legal theory is the individual. Groups,
in this view, were simply artificial aggregations of individuals. On the other hand,
it was the goal of the Realists to show that groups, in fact, had an organic unity,
that the group was greater than the mere sum of its parts. In all the Western countries, therefore, theories of corporate personality were associated with a crisis of
legitimacy in liberal individualism arising from the recent emergence of powerful
collective institutions.

2.

The American Legal Struggle to Reconceptualize the Corporation

By the late nineteenth century in America, fundamental changes had already
taken place in the legal treatment of the corporation. First, and by far the most
important, was the erosion of the so-called "grant" or "concession" theory of
the corporation, which treated the act of incorporation as a special privilege conferred by the state for the pursuit of public purposes.' Under the grant theory,
the business corporation was regarded as an "artifical being" created by the state
with powers strictly limited by its charter of incorporation. As we shall see, a number
of more specific legal doctrines were also derived from the grant theory in order
to enforce the state's interest in limiting and confining corporate power.
The political mechanism used to enforce the grant theory was the special charter
of incorporation, passed by the state legislature after negotiation between private
interests and the state. During the Jacksonian period, special charters were denounced
for their encouragement of legislative bribery, political favoritism, and, above all,
monopoly. As a result, the movement for "free incorporation" laws that would
break the connection between the act of incorporation and political favoritism and
corruption triumphed between 1850 and 1870.42 Gradually, by making the corporate
form universally available, free incorporation undermined the grant theory. Incorporation eventually came to be regarded not as a special state-conferred privilege
but as a normal and regular mode of doing business.
The problem faced by legal thinkers during the late nineteenth century was
how to reconceptualize the corporation after the demise of the grant theory. On
one hand, free incorporation provided the opportunity to treat the corporation under
ordinary contractual categories familiar to partnership law. On the other hand,

"' Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 636 quoted in J.
BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES,
12

Id.

HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE

1780-1970 9 (1970).
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many of the special attributes"3 of the corporation could not be explained or defended
by partnership analogies. As a result, during the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the legal literature is filled with discussions of the nature of the corporationwhether, like a partnership, it is a mere "aggregate" of individuals or whether,
instead, it is an "entity," separate from the individuals who compose it.
Up through the 1880s, there was a strong tendency to analyze corporation law
not very differently from the law of partnership.4 ' Indeed, many of the rules
involving the internal governance of the corporation were borrowed from partnership law, the most important of which was the requirement of shareholder unanimity
for "fundamental" changes in corporate purpose. ' Moreover, the erosion of the
grant theory seemed to leave no choice but to create a conception of the corporation with powers flowing from the bottom up-from shareholders to directors to
officers. This basic model of the corporation, emphasizing the property rights of
shareholders, is the one put forth in Santa Clara by John Norton Pomeroy and
Justice Field.
Later, shortly before the First World War, the partnership conception could
not equally accomplish the task of legitimation when the court turned to less material,
less property-centered claims of corporate constitutional rights against unreasonable
search and seizure and self-incrimination. Here, it was difficult to reduce the constitutional claim of the corporation to the constitutional rights of the shareholders.
In constitutional law, therefore, the first Supreme Court "natural entity" opinion
was the 1905 decision in Hale v. Henke16 extending fourth amendment protections
to the corporation. But the Court's continuing reluctance to entirely personify the
corporation is underlined by its decision in the same case refusing to extend fifth
amendment protection against self-incrimination to corporations.
Despite the Supreme Court's continued hesitancy, by 1900, the "entity" theory
had largely triumphed and corporation and partnership law had moved in radically
different directions. The success of legal thinkers in reconceptualizing the corporation seems to have had important consequences for the legitimacy of the corporate
entity.
",See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
- See infra notes 146-150 and accompanying text.
" See infra note 120 and accompanying text.
46 Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1905). As late as 1904, the Supreme
Court declared: "A corporation, while by fiction of law recognized for some purposes as a person, and for purposes of jurisdiction
as a citizen, is not endowed with the inalienable rights of a natural person." Northern Securities Co.
v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 362 (1904). And in 1906 it stated that "the liberty guaranteed by the
fourteenth amendment against deprivation without due process of law is the liberty of natural, not
artificial, persons." Western Turf Assoc. v. Greenberg, 204 U.S. 359, 363 (1906) (citing Northwestern
Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243, 255 (1906)).
This way of thinking began to crumble with Hale, 201 U.S. 43, and was finally put to rest in
1910 in a series of "unconstitutional conditions" cases involving foreign corporations. See infra note
71, and G. HENDERSON, infra note 67, at 132-47.
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The triumph of the entity theory parallels another development in late nineteenth century corporate law-the tendency to shift power away from shareholders,
first in favor of directors and later to professional managers. 47 By contrast, in 1875,
by analogy to the partnership, American law tended to conceive of directors as
agents of shareholders. After 1900, however, directors were more frequently treated
as equivalent to the corporation itself." This realignment of legal powers within
the corporation thus made the entity theory ever more plausible. In turn, the entity
theory produced court decisions that promoted oligarchical tendencies within the
business corporation.
The collapse of the grant theory eventually produced the best of all possible
worlds for the expansion of corporate power. By rendering the corporate form
normal and regular, late nineteenth century corporate theory shifted the presumption of corporate regulation against the state. Since corporations could no longer
be treated as special creatures of the state, they were entitled to the same privileges
as all other individuals and groups. While the state thus lost any special claimsarising out of the original theory of corporate creation-to regulate corporations,
the once powerful grant theory did make it easier to continue to conceive of the
corporation-as a supra-individualistic entity. As a result, late nineteenth century
entity theorists drew on the early history of corporations to justify their assertion
of its organic and collective nature at the same time as they disavowed the completely subordinate position that that theory had created for the corporation.
Thus, one can clearly see that the natural entity theory of the corporation
ascribed to the Santa Clara case was only just being formulated at the turn of
the century. In 1886 corporate theory was in a state of flux both legally and intellectually and the natural entity theory really was not yet available to justify the
holding in the Santa Clara case. It was only afterwards that theorists began to
recognize the reality of corporate growth.

III.

THE CONCEPT OF CORPORATE PERSONALITY AND ITS
DETERMINATE LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE

A.

Corporate Personality

The corporation occupied an anomalous position in American law throughout
the nineteenth century. In a legal system whose categories were built around
individual activity, it was not at all easy to assimilate the behavior of groups.
Inherently individualistic legal conceptions like "fault" and "will" were difficult
to apply to corporations. "How is it possible," Ernst Freund asked in 1897, "upon
any other basis [than the individual person], to deal with notions that are constantly

"'

A.

CHANDLER,

THE

VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS

161

(1983).
"' See infra note 202 and accompanying text.
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applied to the holding of rights, and which explain their most important incidents:
intention, notice, good and bad faith, responsibility? How can we establish, unless49
we have to deal with individuals, the internal connection between act and liability?"1
Any conception of corporate rights, Freund emphasized, would involve "a
departure from well-settled principles."
If the individual, private, and beneficial right is to measure and govern all rules
relating to rights of whatsoever nature, then the corporate right will continue to
be abnormal and illogical. If, on the other hand, we emancipate ourselves from
the absolute recognition of one form of right as orthodox, . . we may well arrive

at the conclusion, that in dealing with associations of persons we must modify
the ideas which we have derived from the right of property in individuals, and

what has first seemed to be an anomaly will appeal simply as another but equally
legitimate form of development."

The corporation also stood in clear contradiction to a legal culture dominated
by Lockean ideas of pre-social natural rights. In post-revolutionary America, there
was no better example of the social creation of property than the chartered business
corporation. As natural rights theories grew in power and scope after the Civil
War,5 the corporation thus seemed to constitute a standing contradiction to any
claims to the pre-social character of property rights.
Three conceptions of the legal organization of the corporation competed for
dominance after 1880. The traditional conception, derived from the ante-bellum
grant theory, as well as older English corporation law, characterized the corporation as "an artificial entity created by positive law." 5 2 But as the movement for
free incorporation eroded the force of the grant theory, two other conceptions of
the corporation began to emerge with radically different implications for the development of corporation law. In substantially different ways, these two newer theories
sought to convey the idea that incorporation was a normal and natural mode of
business organization, not a special privilege bestowed by the state.
In reaction to the grant theory, some legal writers during the 1880s began to
put forth a polar opposite conception of the corporation as a creature of free contract among individual shareholders, no different, in effect, from a partnership.
, E. FREUND, supra note 32, at 10.
SO Id. at 48.
See generally C.G. HAINES, THE REVIVAL OF NATURAL LAW CONCEPTS (1930).

The most dramatic, largely because it seems so out of place, is Chief Justice Marshall's effort
in Bank of United States v. Devereux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809) to base the diversity jurisdiction
of corporations on the residence of its shareholders. By the 1840s this approach was abandoned with
the conclusive presumption that the shareholders were citizens of the state of incorporation. Louisville
R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844). A more far reaching act of disaggregation-which remained ambiguous and muted-was the implied distinction in the Dartmouth College case between,
on the one hand, the artificial and socially created corporation and, on the other hand, the vested
rights of the shareholders. See also J. HURST, supra note 41, at 15-22.
'

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol88/iss2/5

12

Horwitz: Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory
SANTA CLARA

1985]

In this conception, the corporation was not a creature of the state but of individual
initiative and enterprise. It was "private," not "public."
A third theory which emerged during the 1890s also sought to represent the
corporation as private, yet neither as "artifical," "fictional," nor as a creature
of the state. This "natural entity" theory soon began to be projected onto the
ambiguous opinion of the Supreme Court in the Santa Clara case.
The term "corporate personality" is itself an important clue to the intellectual
crisis. The "aggregate" or contractual view of the corporation seemed capable of
restricting corporate privileges and, in particular, the rule of limited liability. That
there was a close relationship between the justification for limited liability and a
conception of the corporation as a separate (though "artifical") entity distinct from
its shareholders was clear to Chief Justice Taney as early as 1839. If the entity
were disregarded, Taney wrote,
and ... the members of a corporation were to be regarded as individuals carrying
on business in their corporate name, and therefore entitled to the privileges of citizens
in matters of contract, it is very clear that they must at the same time take upon
themselves the liabilities of citizens and be bound by their contracts in like manner.
The result of this would be to make a corporation a mere partnership in business,
in which each stockholder would be liable to the whole extent of his property for
the debts of the corporation; and he might be sued for them in any state in which
he might happen to be found. 3
Not only did Taney believe that there was a logical connection between an
entity theory and limited liability; he also maintained in perfectly straightforward
Jacksonian fashion that every effort of corporations to claim that they were constitutionally "entitled to the privileges of citizens" would erode the entity theory
by forcing courts to turn to the rights of shareholders. There was a trade-off, he
supposed, between the grant of corporate privileges and the claim of shareholder
constitutional rights. He could not yet even imagine that the fictional entity itself
could plausibly claim constitutional privileges. The effort to protect corporate
property in Santa Clara through a conception of shareholder rights thus raised
precisely the danger that Chief Justice Taney identified-it might undermine the
justification for limited liability.
The effort of some legal thinkers beginning in the 1880s to treat the corporation as no different from a partnership was reinforced in a series of anti-consolidation
cases in which courts looked behind the corporate entity to treat the shareholders
as the real legal actors in the corporation. The most famous of these cases was
the attack on the Standard Oil Trust by the State of Ohio."4 Ohio brought quo
warranto proceedings against the Standard Oil Company, maintaining that it had
acted beyond its corporate powers in joining the trust. Since a majority of the
"
"

Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 586 (1839).
State v. Standard Oil Co., 49 Ohio St. 137, 30 N.E. 279 (1892).
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individual shareholders had voted to transfer their stock to the trust, the corporation maintained that only the shareholders, not the corporation, had acted. In piercing the corporate veil, Ohio Supreme Court Justice Minshall treated the idea "that
a corporation is a legal entity apart from the natural persons who compose it"
as "a mere fiction."
It appears that the intense efforts of most judges and legal writers during the
1880s and 1890s to equate the corporation with its stockholders was motivated by
a delegitimating strategy, deriving from anti-corporate and anti-consolidation sentiment. Of course, the defendants of corporate property in Santa Clara also made
use of this theory, which seemed to them at the time more favorable to the corporation than the traditional "artificial entity" theory. Yet, given the structure
of American legal ideas, it may have seemed the only way to turn once the implications of the demise of the grant theory rendered the entity conception of the corporation more problematic.

B.

Ultra Vires
[Ulnfortunately, there is now in this country a newer growth of corporation lawyers
and authors, fostered and fashioned in the same school, who would confuse the
subject by regarding the rights, duties and powers of a corporation as identical
with the rights, duties and powers of the individuals composing it. To recognize
such an anomalous position would clearly nullify, in great measure, the whole doctrine of ultra vires.
Reuben A. Reese, The True Doctrine of Ultra Vires in the Law of Corporations (1897)"

The doctrine that a corporation cannot act beyond its legal competence is
perhaps the best reflection of the traditional legal conception of the nature of the
corporation. At one pole, to the extent that the corporation is fully thought of
as an artificial entity created by the state, we would expect courts strictly to construe powers granted in the corporate charter and refuse effect to corporate activity
regarded as beyond the powers conferred. At the opposite pole, to the extent that
a corporation is regarded simply as a convenient device for conducting business
activity, not as a privilege or concession derived from the state, we would expect
the death of the ultra vires doctrine.
Before the Civil War, in fact, the ultra vires doctrine was strictly applied by
American courts, thereby voiding most transactions held to be outside the grant
of a corporation's powers. 6 By 1930, the ultra vires doctrine was, if not dead,
R. REESE, THE
56

TRUE DOCTRINE OF ULTRA VIRES IN THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS

2 (1897).

See Colson, The Doctrine of Ultra Vires in United States Supreme Court Decisions 1, 42 W.

VA. L.Q. 179, 184-89 (1936).
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substantially eroded in practice,5" reflecting the triumphant view that corporate
organization was a normal and natural form of business activity.
During the half century after 1880 we can trace the tension between those doctrines that reflected the old vision of corporate powers as a state-conferred privilege
and the emergence of newer theories designed to represent the corporation as a
"natural" form of business organization. It also represents one of many technical
expressions of the conflict over political economy between small entrepreneurs and
emergent big business over the legitimacy of large scale enterprise. In this setting,
the doctrine of ultra vires provides us with one measure of conflict.
At first glance, the doctrine of ultra vires was still a powerful judicial tool
as late as 1900, despite the seemingly contrary message of state general incorporation laws, which had become the norm between 1850 and 1870. Yet there was still
a long ideological distance to travel between the first general incorporation laws,
which continued to impose many restrictions on corporate financing and structure,
and the New Jersey incorporation law, first enacted in 1889, whose major premise
was that a corporation could do virtually anything it wanted." Even within the
context of early general incorporation, therefore, the state did not entirely renounce
its role as creator and regulator.
While judicial decisions during the last decades of the nineteenth century thus
continued to invoke the ultra vires doctrine and its underlying conception of the
corporation as an artificial entity, many important changes in corporation law had
strengthened the view that the ultra vires doctrine was an anachronism "now honored
more in the breach than in the observance." 59 Even in jurisdictions that still dealt
harshly with ultra vires acts, the definition of legitimate corporate powers had for
a long time been expanding. "The courts," wrote William W. Cook in his 1894
treatise on corporation law, "are becoming more liberal, and many acts which fifty
years ago would have been held to be ultra vires would now be held to be intra
vires. The courts have gradually enlarged the implied powers of ordinary corporations until now such corporations may do almost anything that an individual may
0
do, provided the stockholders and creditors do not object."'
Even concededly ultra vires activity had begun to receive recognition by the
courts. Since corporations already had been made liable in tort as well as prosecuted
criminally for ultra vires acts, the doctrine had increasingly reflected considerable
internal contradiction. The exceptions, many commentators noted, were beginning
to eat up the rule. Even within the last remaining bastion of the ultra vires rule,
the law of contracts, courts after the Civil War had begun a retreat. While they
17 Id.
11

See infra note 95.

,1 5 S. THOMPSON, supra note 35, at 4629.
6

1 W. COOK, TREATISE ON STOCK AND STOCKHOLDERS, BONDS, MORTGAGES, AND GENERAL COR-

PORATION LAW 971-73 (3rd ed. 1894).
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continued to refuse to enforce "executory" contracts-those where neither party
had performed-they now refused to intervene to upset property rights acquired
under "executed" ultra vires contracts. By the 1880s, the majority of state courts
had gone one step further to enforce even contracts that, despite lack of corporate
power, had been performed by one side to the agreement." Yet, the United States
Supreme Court, after a short flirtation with a "liberalized" ultra vires rule during
the 1870s, became the most ardent defender of traditional doctrine, consistently
rejecting the majority view that partially performed contracts could be enforced. 2
Until at least 1930, the Supreme Court continued to resist the trend of state
decisions 63 as well as the appeals of legal scholars for relaxing ultra vires limitations. 4
The contradictions and inconsistencies in ultra vires doctrine were becoming
unmanageable. "The doctrine of ultra vires is disappearing," wrote William W.
Cook in 1898. "The old theory that a corporate act beyond the express and implied
corporate powers was illegal and not enforceable, no matter whether any actual
injury had been done or not, has given way to the practical view that the parties
to a contract which has been partially or wholly executed will not be allowed to
say it was ultra vires of the corporation.' 65 While judges thus continued to sound
like ante-bellum grant theorists when they were deciding executory contract cases,
the vitality and coherence of the grant theory and the regulatory premises that
underlay it had long been eroded.
C. Foreign Corporations
Despite the advent of general incorporation laws by the 1870s, we have seen
that the Supreme Court continued into the twentieth century to treat the corporation as an artificial entity subject to ultra vires constraints. 66 It was only a series
of state corporation statutes buttressed by Legal Realist attacks that finally destroyed
most ultra vires limitations during the 1920s.
A second set of doctrines provides another measure of the gradual shift in
the conception of the corporation from an artificial to a real or natural entity.
5 S.

supra note 35, at 4664-78.
Bank v. Matthews, 96 U.S. 258 (1877) and San Antonio v. Mehaffy, 96
U.S. 312 (1877) with Thomas v. West Jersey R.R., 101 U.S. 71 (1879); See also Colson, supra note
56, at 207-09, 213 (1936).
63 See Colson, The Doctrine of Ultra Vires in United States Supreme Court Decisions 11, 42 W.
VA. L.Q. 297, 330 (1936).
6 See Carpenter, Should the Doctrine of Ultra Vires be Discarded?, 33 YALE L.J. 49 (1923).
THOMPSON,

62 Compare National

6

v

1 W.

COOK, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS HAVING A CAPITAL STOCK,

vii-viii (4th

ed. 1898). "In the federal courts ... the old rule against ultra vires contracts is upheld in all its rigor
and applied with all its severity. The tendency of modern jurisprudence to relax on that subject finds
no favor in the federal courts" (7th ed. 1913).
66 See Colson, supra notes 56 and 63.
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They deal with the power of a state to exclude foreign corporations-corporations
chartered in another state-from doing business within its boundaries.
The "original fountain head of the law of foreign corporations"' 7 was Chief
Justice Taney's decision in Bank of Augusta v. Earle" (1839), which represents
as clear a statement of the artificial entity theory as any in American law. The
corporation "exists only in contemplation of law, and by force of the law," wrote
Taney. Since it is "a mere artificial being" of the state of its creation, "where
that law ceases to operate, and is no longer obligatory, the corporation can have
no existence." 6 9 Thus, a state was not constitutionally obliged to allow foreign corporations to do business within its boundaries.
The doctrine of Bank of Augusta v. Earle was vigorously reaffirmed after the
Civil War7 0 and continued to find favor in the United States Supreme Court
throughout the nineteenth century, even in the face of the Court's assumption that
the corporation was a "person" under the fourteenth amendment. By the end of
the nineteenth century, however, there were signs of increasing strain not only between an expanding Supreme Court protection of interstate commerce and the
foreign incorporation doctrine but also between the latter and the natural entity
conception that was emerging in legal thought. And yet it was only in a group
of cases in 1910 that the Supreme Court really put to rests the doctrine of Bank
of Augusta v. Earle.7 1 From that time on, expanding fourteenth amendment protections of the corporation swept aside Taney's vision of the business corporation
as an artificial creature of the state.
As with the history of ultra vires, we see that it was not the Supreme Court
of the Gilded Age that renounced the artificial entity theory of the corporation
but rather the judges and legal writers of the early twentieth century who came
to understand the corporation as a normal and natural mode of doing business.
And, as we shall see, it was a group of Legal Realist legal thinkers who developed
and articulated this new conception of the corporation.
From the era of general incorporation onward, legal writers commented on
the disparity between the reality of free incorporation and those "artificial" and
"unrealistic" restrictions on corporate power that continued to derive from the
ante-bellum grant theory. Yet, in the Supreme Court, an "old" conservative majority
perpetuated the Jacksonian tradition of competitive capitalism and suspicion of

1'G. HENDERSON, THE POSITION OF FOREIGN
42 (1918).
" Bank of Augusta, 38 U.S. at 587-88.

CORPORATIONS IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

6' Id. at 588.
70 Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868).
"

Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1 (1910); Pullman Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S.

56 (1910); Ludwig v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 216 U.S. 146 (1910); Southern Ry. v. Greene,

216 U.S. 400 (1910).
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corporate power" not only by continuing to invoke legal doctrines derived from
the artificial entity theory but by giving a strict literalist reading to the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act. 73 Around 1910 or 1911, the "new" conservatives finally overthrew
the strict construction of the Sherman Act in the Standard Oil case;74 they also
reversed those doctrines in corporation law based on a conception of the corporation as a creature of the state.
D.

The "'Inevitability" of Concentration
Are the large combination of capitalists and corporations known as "trusts" a logical
and therefore proper development of the present economic system, or are they
abnormal excrescences that can and should be eradicated by legislation?
Question to Professor William W. Folwell of the University of Minnesota by
a Committee of the Minneapolis Socialist Labor Party (1888)."

The efforts by legal thinkers to legitimate the business corporation during the
1890s were buttressed by a stunning reversal in American economic thought-a
movement to defend and justify as inevitable the emergence of large-scale corporate
concentration.
Until the late 1880s, prevailing American economic thought refused to accept
either the inevitability or the naturalness of large-scale concentrations of capital.
Most discussion of the "monopoly problem" during the 1870s and early 1880s
focused on the railroad, which was treated as something of a special case.76 Whether
defenders and opponents of railroad consolidation emphasized the "overproduction" of lines after the Civil War or whether they argued about a "natural
monopoly" analysis of the railroad, they tended to regard the problem as unique.
Before the late 1880s, few saw in the railroad problem any more general pattern
of industrial concentration.
Popular attention began to be drawn to the question of industrial concentration with the publication of Henry D. Lloyd's muckraking articles on monopoly.
72 Horwitz,

Progressive Legal Historiography, 63 OR. L. REV. 679 (1984).
United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897); United States v. Joint
Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898); Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578 (1898); Anderson v. United
States, 171 U.S. 604 (1898); Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States; 175 U.S. 211 (1899). The
clearest statement of this "literalist" interpretation was given by Justice Peckham in Trans-Missouri:
When, therefore, the body of an act pronounces as illegal every contract or combination
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, etc., the plain and ordinary meaning
of such language is not limited to that kind of contract alone which is in unreasonable restraint
of trade, but all contracts are included in such language, and no exception or limitation can
be added without placing the act that which has been omitted by Congress.
Trans-Missouri, 166 U.S. at 328.
"

"

Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).

"

See 3 J.

76

DORFMAN, THE ECONOMIC MIND IN AMERICAN CIVILIZATION

138 (1949).

See, e.g., S. DILLAYE, MONOPOLIES: THEIR ORIGIN, GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT (1882).
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His first magazine article, "The Story of a Great Monopoly,"" in 1881, was an
attack on the Standard Oil Company. "As early as 1884 he asserted that combinations were dominating, most, if not all, industries in the country, from coffin-making
to iron pipe foundries. 7 8 Above all, the attention paid to formation of the notorious
"trusts" during the 1880s, raised more general questions concerning the causes of
industrial concentration.
In 1882, the first great trust, the Standard Oil, was born, after "the sharp
mind of Standard's legal counsel, S. L. T. Dodd, conceived of the new trust form
of organization. ' ""7 The trust was designed to bring about corporate consolidation
while avoiding the prohibition under state corporation laws of one corporation
holding the stock of another. Since the individual shareholders of the consolidating
corporations tendered their stock to trustees in exchange for trust certificates, the
resulting trust was not incorporated and hence was thought to be immune from
the limitations of corporation law.
Five other successful, nation-wide trusts were organized during the 1880s: the
American Cotton Oil Trust (1884), National Linseed Oil Trust (1885), the National
Lead Trust (1887), the Whiskey & Sugar Trusts (1889). The "trust problem"
therefore became a central issue of public policy only a few years before the Sherman
Act was enacted in 1890. The Act itself reflected the still widely shared orthodox
laissez faire position that industrial concentration was an unnatural interference
with the laws of free competition and could only be achieved through conspiracy
or illicit financial manipulation. Except for the relatively rare case of "natural
monopoly," it was thought that the "laws" of the market-especially the "law
of diminishing returns"-would continue to prevail.
Some orthodox theorists traced the causes of monopoly to illegitimate governmental interference in the economy-through tariffs and other instrusions on free
competition, governmental grants to railroads, grants of corporate privileges, and
the operation of the patent laws. But most were complacently confident that
monopoly was inherently impermanent. "'Trusts', as a rule, are not dangerous,"
the Dean of the Columbia Law School, Theodore W. Dwight, wrote in 1888. "They
cannot overcome the law of demand and supply nor the resistless power of unlimited
competition." 8 0 Indeed, the intellectual paralysis of laissez faire theorists in the
face of combination was captured best in 1891 by Judge Seymour Thompson of
St. Louis, a vocal opponent of the Trust.
The problem ...of restraining corporate and individual combinations and
monopolies, is the problem of restraining a species of communism; it is communism

7 Lloyd, The Story of a Great Monopoly, 47 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 317 (1881).
" H. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: ORIGINATION OF AN AMERICAN
(1954) (citing Lloyd, Lords of Industry, 138 N. AM. REv. 535-53 (1884)).
79A. CHANDLER, supra note 47, at 323.
1 Dwight, The Legality of Trusts, 3 POL. Sci. Q. 592, 631 (1888).
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against communism, and the question is, how far communism ought to go in restraining communism. The general rule is that it ought not to go at all. The general
rule is that commerce should be free. ....
81
Beginning in the late 1880s, however, several writers began to ponder the question of whether large-scale enterprise was inevitable. Perhaps the earliest was Arthur
T. Hadley, whose book, RailroadTransportation(1885), was the first to generalize
from railroad consolidation to the inevitability of industrial concentration. Seeing
"the present age" as "an age of industrial monopoly," Hadley argued that the
American economy was moving away from free competition. Yet, the existing system
of thought blinded men to the changes that were occurring.
All our education and habit of mind make us believe in competition. We have
been taught to regard it as a natural if not necessary condition of a healthful business
life. We look with satisfaction on whatever favors it, and with distrust on whatever
hinders it. We accept almost without reserve the theory of Ricardo, that, under
open competition in a free market, the value of different goods will tend to be
proportional to their cost of production. 2
But, ultimately, Hadley's analysis was limited by his effort to generalize from the
railroad problem. He sought to explain the particular forms of "cut-throat competition" that enabled railroads to cut prices below marginal costs, but he did not
propose any general analysis of how industrial concentration could be explained
in terms of economic theory. That task fell to another writer, Henry C. Adams,
the chief statistician for the newly formed Inter-State Commerce Commission.
Adams' brilliant and influential tract, "The Relation of the State to Industrial
Enterprise" was the best expression of the new anti-laissez faire sentiment behind
the recently formed American Economic Association.13 It sought to define the conditions under which governmental regulation would be legitimate. Seeking to explain
industrial concentration, Adams invoked John Stuart Mill's tripartite distinction
among industries that displayed "constant," "diminishing," or "increasing" returns
to scale. While the railroad was "a good illustration of this third class of industries," 8 there were also "many other lines of business which conform to the
principle of increasing returns, and for that reason come under the rule of cen85
tralized control.'

" S. THOMPSON, The Power of the People Over Corporate and Individual Combinations and

Monopolies, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ILL. STATE BAR Ass'N 81, 84 (1891). Thompson concluded that

"as a general rule, we may safely trust to the operation of natural laws and to the inherent weakness
of every human combination, for a sufficient remedy." Id. at 90.
82 A. HADLEY, RAILROAD TRANSPORTATION-ITs HISTORY AND ITS LAWS 69 (1885) (quoted in W.
COOK supra note 60, at 127).
T. HASKELL, THE EMERGENCE OF PROFESSIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCE (1977).
Adams, The Relation of the Slate to Industrial Action, 1 PUBLICATIONS OF THE AM. EcON.
Ass'N 7, 61 (1887).
15Id. at 64.
'
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Such businesses are by nature monopolies. We certainly deceive ourselves in believing that competition can secure for the public fair treatment in such cases, or that
laws compelling competition can ever be enforced. If it is for the interest of men
to combine no law can make them compete. For all industries, therefore, which
conform to the principle of increasing returns, the only question at issue is, whether

society shall support an irresponsible, extra-legal monopoly, 6 or a monopoly
established by law and managed in the interest of the public.

Though it was thereafter expressed in many different ways, the argument for
the inevitability of industrial concentration always represented some variation on
Adams' original insight about increasing returns to scale.
Among the earliest to proclaim the inevitability of industrial concentration were
social thinkers who were influenced by European socialism and Marx's prediction
of the inevitability of monopoly capitalism. In 1889, President E. Benjamin Andrew
of Brown University declared that the competitive system was fast disappearing
and giving way to trusts and combinations." Although competition had "hitherto
been assumed as the certain postulate of all economic analysis and generalization,"
in fact "in a great variety of industries, perhaps a majority of all, permanent
monopolies may be maintained, apart from any legislative or special aids.. .. No
88
economic laws prevent the permanent existence of monopolies. ....
In the same year, the Christian Socialist Edward Bellamy pronounced with
satisfaction the "doom" of the competitive system. Competition was at odds with
the fundamental principles of Christianity. "[T]he competitive system tends to
develop what is worst in the character of all, whether rich or poor. The qualities
which it discourages are the noblest and most generous that men have, and the
sordid instincts which humanity
qualities which it rewards are those selfish and
''
can only hope to rise about by outgrowing.
Moving from the "moral iniquities of competition," 9 he turned to an analysis
of the causes of consolidation. "It is a result of the increase in the efficiency of
capital in great masses, consequent upon the inventions of the last and present
generations. . . .The economies in management resulting from consolidation, as
well as the control over the market resulting from the monopoly of a staple, are
9
also solid business reasons for the advent of the Trust." '
The few economists who still seriously defend the competitive system are herocially
sacrificing their reputations in the effort to mask the evacuation of a position which,
as nobody knows better than our hard-headed captains of industry, has become
untenable .... While the economists have been wisely debating whether we could
86

"

Id.
Andrews, Trusts According to Official Investigations, 3 Q.J. EcoN. 117 (1889).
Andrews, The Economic Law of Monopoly, 26 J. Soc. Sci. 1 (1890).
E. BELLAMY, PLUTOCRACY OR NATIONALISM-WHICH? 2 (1889).
Id. at 3.

Id. at 5.
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dispense with the principle of individual initiative in business, that principle has
passed away, and now belongs to history.9"
Except for his conclusion, Bellamy's vision of the inevitability of economic
concentration was echoed by the new titans of industry. In 1888, the President
of the American Cotton Oil Trust, John H. Flagler, defended the development
of trusts as a reflection of "a steady, logical and wise evolution, or improvement
in the method of conducting industrial affairs." There was an historical evolution
in the conduct of business which passed through "successive stages of development" from individual to partnership to corporation and, now, to the trust. "This
progressive development in the machinery for the conduct of business was impelled
by the growing and ever-increasing demand for larger facilities, greater capital,
greater energy, combination of activities, skill and intelligences." 93
The courts did not yet agree. Beginning in the late 1880s, six different states
brought quo warrantosuits to revoke the charters of corporations that had become
constituents of one of the great trusts.9" The most famous lawsuits involved the
successful Ohio and New York attacks on, respectively, the Standard Oil and Sugar
Trusts.95 In both cases, the courts dealt a set-back to any "entity" theory of the
corporation, holding that the act of the individual shareholders in joining the trust
was really the act of the corporation.
As the attacks on the trust form mounted, corporation lawyers realized that
the earlier strategy of simply evading the restrictions of corporation law would no
longer work. "It was considered wise to yield in the matter of form. The trusts
'
were transformed into companies." 96
In the words of the biographer of one of
these lawyers, William Nelson Cromwell, "[t]he vulnerability of the trust arrangement to the combination and conspiracy concept of the Sherman Act and to the
legal analysis of the Ohio and New York decisions led to the finding of new legal
techniques. The need was met by an amendment to the Corporation law of New
Jersey." 97 Several corporation lawyers connected with Cromwell's firm "were among
those active in the drafting of this amendment." 98 And, as Alfred D. Chandler
has written, "The New Jersey legislature quickly obliged." 9 9

Id. at 1, 5.
Address by Mr. John H. Flagler Before the Commercial Club of Providence, Rhode Island
(December 15, 1888).
" People v. Chicago Gas Trust Co., 130 11. 268, 22 N.E. 789 (1887); People v. North River
Sugar Refining Co., 22 Abb. N. Cas. 164 (1889); State v. Nebraska Distilling Co., 29 Neb. 700, 46
N.W. 155 (1890). See Louisiana v. American Cotton-Oil Trust, I Ry. & CORP. L.J. 509 (1887); California
v. American Sugar Refining Co. 7 RY. & CORP. L.J. 83 (1890).
" See North River Sugar Refining Co., 22 Abb. N. Cas. 164.
96 E. VoN HALLE, TRUSTS OR INDUSTRIAL COMBINATIONS AND COALITIONS 94 (1895).
, Dean, A Tribute to William Nelson Cromwell: An Address Delivered at the Cromwell Library
of the American Bar Foundation, Chicago, Illinois (February 22, 1955) 69.
92

"

91 Id. at 70.
11

A.

CHANDLER,

supra note 47.
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The New Jersey Act of 1889, ' 0 which permitted incorporation "for any lawful
business or purpose whatever," was among the first to allow one corporation to
own the stock of another, thus legalizing the holding company and making the
trust device unnecessary. Cromwell, himself, seems to have been the first lawyer
to use the New Jersey provisions. As counsel to the Cotton Oil Trust, he appears
to have conceived of the need for the New Jersey law after a lower court in Louisiana in 1889 sustained the state's effort to dissolve several of the Trust's constituent corporations.
Pending the appeal of an adverse decision, Cromwell called special meetings of
all of the constituent corporations, obtained the necessary proxies and quietly
dissolved the Louisiana corporations and transferred all their assets to a Rhode
Island corporation set up for that purpose, whose stock was held by the trustees.
When the appeal came on, he announced to the consternation of the Attorney
General of Louisiana that the relief requested was no longer necessary for the Corporations were no longer in existence ....101

In the same year, the American Cotton Oil Trust was reorganized once more
as a New Jersey holding company, perhaps the first major enterprise to take
advantage of.the change in New Jersey law. The successful New York attack on
the Sugar Trust also led it to reorganize as a New Jersey corporation. It soon received
the additional benefit of immunity from the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, when the
United States Supreme Court held in the E.C. Knight Case' 2 that the Act could
not constitutionally reach "manufacturing."
After the passage of the New Jersey Act, the entire expenses of the state of
New Jersey were paid out of corporation fees. "[S]o many Trusts and big corporations were paying tribute to the State of New Jersey," noted New York corporation lawyer Charles F. Bostwick, "that the authorities had become greatly perplex-3 "[T]he relation
ed as to what should be done with [its] surplus revenue. . "...
of the state toward the corporations resembles that between a feudal baron and
the burghers of old, who paid for protection," observed William H. Cook.' 4 Lincoln Steffens simply called New Jersey "the traitor state. 105
The passage of the New Jersey Corporation Act, followed by a rapid capitulation of many other states, marked the end of all serious efforts to use corporation
law to regulate consolidation. Urging repeal of many New York restrictions on
corporations, New York lawyer Charles F. Bostwick noted "the sudden exodus
of hundreds upon hundreds of millions of dollars, controlled by corporate interests
and financiers from New York into the State of New Jersey" ' 6 during the decade
300
03

N.J. Laws, Ch. 269, § 4 at 414 (1889).
See supra note 97, at 99.

,02
United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1894).
C. BOSTWICK, LEGISLATIVE COMPETrITION FOR CORPORATE CAPITAL 22 (1899).
COOK, supra note 60 at vi.
0I Steffans, New Jersey: A Traitor State, 25 MCCLURE'S MAG. 41 (1905).
,16C. BOSTWICK, supra note 103, at 1.
'04 W.
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after the passage of the New Jersey law. "New York, although disclaiming any
intention of entering into legislative competition for the securing of corporate capital
within its jurisdiction, is, in fact, one of the most ardent bidders," Bostwick wrote. 0°'
For example, only three years after the passage of the New Jersey law, "the State
of New York could no longer withstand the temptation, and the incorporation laws
of this State were radically amended" to match the single most attractive New Jersey
provision allowing holding companies. "[B]ut this came too late to get back any
fugitive capital and still it continued to go elsewhere."' 0 8
The lesson, for Bostwick, was to further remove most restraints on corporations. "The laissezfaire doctrine is good in government, and similar doctrine applied in politico-economic life is equally good," he concluded.'0 9 As state legislatures
during the 1890s outbid each other in passing ever more "liberal" corporation laws
that removed many of the remaining legal barriers to consolidation, the focus of
those who hoped to preserve competition shifted to the Sherman Act.
But the New Jersey law confirmed the views of those who saw consolidation
as inevitable, and during the 1890s, in both legal and economic writings, there is
a marked shift towards the inevitability thesis." 0 By 1891, William W. Cook could
declare that concentration was the result of "an established principle of economics."
"It is a law of nature," he proclaimed. "These great concerns arise because by
doing business on a large scale they can do it more cheaply.""' "[Miost of the
younger economists of the country who have studied the question thoroughly,"
Von Halle reported in 1896, were "in favour of combinations." "Under the influence of historical thought, they feel convinced that the movement is an
unavoidable step in an organic development, and that it finds its justification in
-,12
the tendencies of modern capitalism ....
For the first time, the full implications of general incorporation laws began
to be developed, and the view that legal forms cannot interfere with the natural
evolution of the economy gained ascendancy. Commenting on the failure of legislation to check consolidation, Cook began the fifth edition of his celebrated treatise
on corporation law with the aphorism, "The laws of trade are stronger than the
laws of men.""' 3
In these writings on corporations, we find the earliest articulation of that contempt for legal form that eventually came to characterize Legal Realism. "Whether
true or false, the maxim 'combination is the life of trade,' is an economic and
in no sense a legal proposition," wrote Arthur J. Eddy, the author of a well known
'°0 Id. at 4.
,01 Id. at 15.
"0' Id. at 11.
110W. LETWIN,

LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA

32

W. COOK, THE CORPORATION PROBLEM 226 (1891).
E. VON HALLE, supra note 96, at 113.

"3

See W. CooK, supra note 65, at vii.
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legal treatise on Combination, in 1901. "If sound, economic forces will protect
it; if unsound, neither legislative enactments nor judicial utterance can give it life
... the courts might as well try to conserve Gresham's law, the Malthusian theory,
Ricardo's doctrine of rent, or any other economic, scientific or philosophic
"4
notion.'''
Legal structures merely reflect the underlying economic substructure. "[T]he
corporate form of co-operation has been like all other industrial, commercial, social
and political forms a matter of development," Eddy explained. "[I]n some sort
it existed prior to its recognition by law . . . the law simply sanctioned a form
of organization which the commercial and industrial world found useful and
indispensable." Even if there were no laws creating corporations, "'men would
necessarily act together . . . in joint associations. . . ." "Since the law is simply
the application of common sense and reason to existing conditions . . . the law
would follow the economic tendency, [and] the collective bodies would be recognized
. . . there would inevitably spring up in a progressive community organizations
in form similar to the modern corporation." '"15 The large industrial corporation
was, in short, a natural reflection of the rational economic tendency towards combination. "Consolidation," concluded William W. Cook, "is the spirit of the age,
moving on resistlessly, regardless of human laws and hostile public sentiment."" 6
Those who "disapprove of trusts and combinations [for] general anti-centralistic
and individualistic reasons," wrote the economist Ernst von Halle in 1896, "play
into the hands of socialism."" 7

E.

Consolidation and Majority Rule

If the private law of corporations-that is, the law regulating relations within
the corporation as well as with private parties-had not changed after 1880, it is
difficult to imagine how the enormous corporate consolidation of the next thirty
years could have taken place. For until the First World War-by which time the
centralization of the American economy was largely accomplished-state corporation law was centrally involved in the question of corporate consolidation.
After 1880, ultra vires doctrines continued to limit the power of corporations
to consolidate. While courts still refused to enforce ultra vires executory contracts,
they generally were not willing to unravel contracts that had already been performed. Most judicial decisions that stood in the way of corporate consolidation did
so on the grounds that a corporation had no power to lease its property to another
corporation or to transfer its stock to a holding company. The single area that
dominated Supreme Court ultra vires decisions between 1880 and 1900 were cases

I1
16

I A. EDDY, THE LAW OF COMBINATIONS, 665-66 (1901).
Id.
W. COOK, supra note 60, at vii (5th ed. 1903).

"I E VON HALLE, supra note 96, at 113.
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involving railroad consolidations. In a series of opinions during the last two decades
of the nineteenth century, the Court consistently struck down as beyond corporate
power arrangements by which one railroad leased all of its facilities to another
line. The terms of these leases almost always exceeded the productive life of the
assets transferred under them. Indeed, the Court occasionally gave its approval
to the truly Draconian rule that the lessor under a void ultra vires agreement could
not sue to recover the leased property or its value.' ' 8 While these "loose" forms
of consolidation confronted various legal impediments, an outright sale of corporate assets to produce a merger rarely ran afoul of ultra vires limitations since
by the time the transactions were challenged in court they had already become
"executed" contracts.
Some state courts were even noticeably unreceptive to the Supreme Court's
views on leases used for consolidation. In 1886, the New Jersey Supreme Court
treated such a lease as a fully executed contract that could not be interfered with. II9
And following a series of decisions generally hostile to the ultra vires doctrine,
the New York high court in 1896 enforced the terms of a public utility lease,
denouncing "the rank injustice" produced by the Supreme Court's ultra vires rule. 2 0
William W. Cook, the treatise writer on corporation law, cheered the New York
decision as "breaking away entirely from the decisions of the Supreme Court of
the United States and of the English courts on this subject . . . . " "The court,"
he wrote, "will not declare a contract void merely to satisfy a superannuated principle of law."' 2' The lease cases caused even Judge Seymour Thompson of St. Louis,
in his 1899 treatise on corporation law, to denounce "the abominable doctrine of
ultra vires."' 22

It is quite clear that the Supreme Court's strict attitude towards ultra vires
doctrine during the late nineteenth century was substantially related to hostility
to corporate consolidation. An "old conservative" majority, favoring small competitive units of production and fearing large-scale enterprise, never really abandoned the traditional view of the corporation as an artificial creature of state power.
It thus consistently deployed the ultra vires doctrine for the purpose of preventing
further concentration.
There were essentially three stages in the efforts of corporations to achieve
consolidation. The first stage, the "pool," represented a "loose" form of agreement employed by railroads, beginning in the 1870s, to fix rates and regulate traf-

"'

Compare St. Louis, Vandalia & Terre Haute R.R. v. Terre Haute & Indianapolis R.R., 145

U.S. 393 (1892) with Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Central Transp. Co., 171 U.S. 138 (1898). See Harriman,
Ultra Vires CorporationLeases, 14 HARV. L. REv. 332 (1900); W.C. NoYEs, A TREATISE ON THE LAW
OF INTERCORPORATE RELATIONS 349-52 (1st ed. 1902).
,, See Camden & Atlantic R.R. v. May's Landing & Egg Harbor City R.R., 48 N.J.L. 530 (1886).
,2° Bath Gas Light Co. v. Claffy, 151 N.Y. 24, 34, 45 N.E. 390, 395 (1896).
W.
W2, CooK, supra, note 60, at viii.
,2' 7 S. THOMPSON, supra note 35, at 7032 (2d ed. 1899).
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fic. Through a combination of ultra vires and anti-trust attacks, this form of
cartelization was eventually defeated, though it had already largely proved unstable
and impossible to enforce.' 23
A second effort, the "trust" or holding company, was fiercely attacked by
state quo warrantodecisions brought against the constituent companies. The New
Jersey Corporation Law of 1889 was drafted to save the trusts, since it was among
the first statutes to allow corporations to own shares in other corporations.' 24 But
even before the federal power was successfully deployed against holding companies
in the Northern Securities case" 5 (1904), the trust form had lost favor, and was
replaced by direct merger.
The merger movement of 1898-1903 seems to have been based on the legal
conclusion that courts might not deploy the Sherman Act to attack consolidation
if it took the form of outright purchase of other businesses. Arthur Eddy wrote
in 1901:
The Courts having condemned simple combinations [e.g. pools or price fixing
agreements] and the trust form of combination as contrary to public policy "the
corporate form naturally suggested itself as a possible escape from the force and
effect of the many decisions adverse to the other forms. It was argued that while
the courts might deny the right of individuals, firms or corporations to meet together
to form associations, pools or agreements with the intent to control prices and
outputs, no court would deny the right of an individual, or of a partnership, or
a corporation to purchase outright the assets, business and good-will of any individual, firm or corporation engaged in the same line of trade or manufacture
....

So long as the state sanctions the creation of corporations without limitations

as to power and capital, then it would seem to follow that within their chartered
rights corporations have the same power to acquire property as has an. individual.' 2 6
It was the task of legal theory to show that there was no difference between
the rights of individuals and corporations to acquire property.
With the merger movement beginning in 1898, corporate strategists thus turned
to outright consolidation. This strategy was undoubtedly encouraged by the
unwillingness of both state and federal courts to use the ultra vires doctrine to
unravel already consummated transactions. 2 7 While the Supreme Court throughout
the 1890s had regularly supported attacks on "loose" forms of consolidation by
refusing to enforce arrangements for long-term lease of corporate assets, the merger
movement rendered ultra vires constraints practically irrelevant.
The new legal pressure point in attacks on corporate consolidation shifted to

,' H.
24
'~'
126

2'

THORELLI, supra note 78, at 73-76.
See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
1 A. EDDY, supra note 114, at 601-02.
Metcalf v. American School Furniture Co., 122 F. 115 (W.D.N.Y. 1903).
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the common law rule that unanimous shareholder consent was necessary for sale
of corporate assets or, indeed, for any "fundamental" change in corporate purposes.
During the 1880s, nearly all courts required unanimous shareholder consent
to corporate consolidations as well as to other "fundamental" corporate changes. 2 '
The rule of unanimous consent, it should be noted, is a dramatic example of the
extent to which partnership-contract categories governed important aspects of corporation law in the period immediately after the Civil War.' 29 Any fundamental
corporate change was regarded as a breach of the individual shareholder's contract
as well as, in effect, an unconsented "taking" of his property.' 30
The obstacle that unanimous shareholder consent presented for consolidation
was seen as early as 1887 by New York lawyer William W. Cook whose successive
treatises on corporation law proclaimed the inevitability of economic concentration. With respect to the legal rule permitting any shareholder to object to a sale
of assets, Cook accurately predicted in 1887, that "large interests will require and
in some way will obtain a removal of the legal right of stockholders to object to
the changes toward which the times are rapidly approaching."' 3 '
By the time the merger movement began, nearly all the states had passed general
consolidation statutes applicable to railroad corporations. 3 2 These statutes permitted
consolidation of lines with less than unanimous shareholder consent. In addition,
by 1901, fourteen states, including Delaware (1899), New York (1890), and New
Jersey (1896), had authorized any corporation "carrying on any kind of business
of the same or similar nature" to merge with less than unanimous shareholder agreement.' 33 The earliest consolidation statutes, therefore, permitted "horizontal" integration, while still denying corporations the power to engage in "vertical" mergers
among different lines of business.

"I See, e.g., Mason v. Pewabic Mining Co. 133 U.S. 50 (1890); State ex rel. Brown v. Bailey,
16 Ind. 46 (1861); McCray v. Junction R.R., 9 Ind. 358 (1857); Stevens v. Ruthland & Burlington
R.R., 29 Vt. 545 (1851); See also Carney, Fundamental Corporate Changes, Minority Shareholders
and Business Purposes, Am. BAR FOUND. RESEARCH J. 69, 88-89 (1980).
"' See ANGELL & AMEs,TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 537, 569 (11 th ed. 1882).
,o 1 V. MoRAWETz, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS iii (2d ed. 1886); See
also Carney supra note 128, at 77-78.
W'
V. COOK, supra note 60 (1st ed. 1887).
32 See statutes cited in W.C. NOYES, supra note 118, at 29 n.l.
'" W.C. NoYES, supra note 118, at 36 n.1 and at 84 n.2. These states were: Alabama (1896),
Colorado (1891), Connecticut (1901), Delaware (1899), Illinois (1895), Kentucky (1894), Louisiana (1874),
Maryland (1888), Missouri (1889), Nevada (1883), New Jersey (1896), New York (1890), Pennsylvania
(1901), Utah (1898). Noyes' list of thirteen states does not include the Pennsylvania statute of 1901.
Actual dates of enactment for Colorado (1877), Illinois (1872), Kentucky (1893), Utah (1896) are found
in the following compilations of state laws: MILLS, MILLS' ANNOTATED STATUTES OF THE STATE OF
COLORADO 688 (1891); 2 W.C. JONES & K.H. ADDINOTON, ANNOTATED STATUTES OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
1588-89 (1913); J. BARBOUR & J. CARROLL, THE KENTUCKY STATUTES 350 (3d ed. 1903); YoUNo, SMITH
& LEE,

THE REVISED STATUTES OF THE STATE OF UTAH
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Vertical integration, therefore, came about not through statutorily authorized
consolidations but through sale of assets. It still had to confront the general common law rule that any sale of corporate assets to achieve consolidation required
unanimous agreement of the shareholders.
There was one small exception to the unanimity rule which was first exploited
by consolidating corporations to avoid the consequences of the rule. Where a corporation was insolvent and had no prospects of profit, courts had permitted a simple
majority of shareholders to wind up the business and sell all of its assets. In the
wake of the merger movement, courts began simply to "rubber stamp" the claims
of the majority that the business was a failing one. 34 As a leading proponent of
corporate consolidation put it in his 1902 treatise on Consolidation:
It has been urged that this power of a majority to wind up a corporation, and
to dispose of its assets for such purpose, exists only in the case of failing concerns.
The distinction is not well drawn ....The very best time to wind up the affairs
of a corporation may be in view of future uncertainties when it is most prosperous
and has accumulated a large surplus. The determination of the question when this
action should be taken, must rest in the discretion of the majority.' 3 '
This position was soon adopted by courts. Since it was clear that a majority could
dissolve an insolvent corporation, "must [they] wait until the stockholders' investment is all lost before taking action?" the New Hampshire Supreme Court asked
in 1912. "If the majority may sell to prevent greater losses, why may they not
also sell to make greater gains?"' 3 6 As a student of the subject has concluded:
"In many [cases], it was ...clear that the losing business was not being abandoned
but was instead being continued by the new corporate owner of the assets ...
By steps, then, these asset sales became de facto consolidations."' 37
At the same time as the judiciary was "sliding ineluctably toward
majoritarianism in major corporation decisions involving shareholders,"' ' 38 state
legislatures began to take the lead in passing statutes allowing a majority to sell
corporate assets. One of the earliest was a New York statute of 1893, which overruled the leading New York case expounding the unanimity rule. 39 In addition,
Delaware in 1899 and New Jersey in 1902 passed legislation providing for appraisal

"' Metcalf v. American School Furniture Co., 122 F. 115; Traer v. Lucas Prospecting Co., 124
Iowa 107, 99 N.W. 290 (1904); Tanner v. Lindell R'y Co., 180 Mo. 1, 79 S.W. 155 (1904); Beidenkopf
v. Des Moines Life Ins. Co. & National Life Ins. Co., 160 Iowa 629, 142 N.W. 434 (1913); Lange
v. Reservation Mining and Smelting Co., 48 Wash 167, 93 P. 208 (1908); Butler v. New Keystone
Copper Co., 10 Del. Ch. 371, 93 A. 380 (1915).
"' W.C. NoyEs, supra note 118, at 174-75.
: 6 Bowditch v. Jackson Co., 76 N.H. 351, 82 A. 1014, 1017 (1912).
"' See Carney, supra note 128, at 88-89.
Id. at 90.
"' See In re Timmis, 200 N.Y. 177, 93 N.E. 522 (1910) for the New York statutory history. The
leading case on shareholder unanimity is Abbott v. American Hard Rubber Co., 33 Barb. 578 (1861).
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and "buy out" of the shares of dissenting minority stockholders.,4" By 1926, there
was "hardly a state . . .where the dominant common law rule . . .ha[d] not

been abrogated by statute or decision."4
The shift to majority rule in fact made the merger movement legally possible.
It not only made consolidations much easier to effect, it also dealt the final blow
to any efforts to conceptualize the corporation as a collection of contracting
individual shareholders.
When the rule of unanimous shareholder consent began to be widely articulated
by courts around the time of the Civil War, the leading treatise on corporations
still regarded business corporations as "little more than limited partnerships, every
member exercising through his vote an immediate control over the interests of the
body." 4' As late as 1890, the leading decision of the United States Supreme Court
did "not see that the rights of the parties in regard to [sale of] the assets of [a]
corporation differ from those of a partnership on its dissolution." 4 3 Itreferred
to a treatise on Partnership before reaffirming the rule of unanimity.
In his brilliant study, The Legal Nature of Corporations(1897), Ernst Freund
understood that the emergence of majority rule within a corporation could only
be justified by some entity theory of the corporation that moved beyond contractualism and conceptions of individual property rights. How could the "corporate
will" be identified with a simple majority of shareholders, Freund asked.
The true corporate will would be expressed by unanimous action resulting from
common deliberation and mutual compromise and submission; but for purposes
of convenience the law stops the process of reaching the conclusion halfway, and
is satisfied with the concurrence of the greater portion of those acting. The justification of this legal expedient lies in the fact that the will of the majority may be
presumed to express correctly what would be the result of forced unanimity; a
presumption not always agreeable to fact, but convenient and more practicable
than any other .... Inso far as the presumption fails to be correct, it cannot be
denied that a will which is not identical with the corporate will is imputed to the
corporation, just as we impute the will of the agent to the principal without insisting
that it should in all cases accord with the principal's will. The same view must
be taken of the acts of other corporate organs; they may likewise be presumed
to voice correctly the corporate will, but their will is not the corporate will strictly
speaking."'

"I The Delaware statute appears in W.C. NoYEs supra, note 118, at 94 n.4.
The New Jersey statute, broadening an 1896 law, appears in W.C. NoYBS, supra note 118, at 232 n.2
(2d ed. 1909). These appraisal statutes, Noyes wrote, "are probably broad enough to be available in

aid of a reorganization through the transfer of corporate assets in exchange for stock." Id. at 232,
14 Weiner, Payment of Dissenting Stockholders, 27 COLUM. L. REV. 547 (1927).
ANGELL & AMES, supra note 129, at 166 (6th ed. 1858).
" Mason v. Pewabic Mining Co., 133 U.S. 50, 59.
E. FREUND, supra note 32, at 10.

'"
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While Freund was tempted to derive majority rule from unanimous shareholder
consent, he was forced to admit that it was a fiction "not always agreeable to
fact." He turned instead to a theory of a separate corporate entity, "imput[ing]"
to the corporation the "will" of the shareholders. Above all, majority rule was
another example of Freund's conclusion "that in dealing with associations of persons we must modify the ideas which we have derived from the right of property
in individuals, and what has first seemed to be an anomaly will appear simply as
another but equally legitimate form of development."' 4

F. Attack on the Entity Theory
The first sustained effort to reconceptualize the corporation in the light of the
triumph of general incorporation laws began during the 1880s.
In 1882, Victor Morawetz published A Treatise on the Law of Private
Corporationswhich proposed a radical reinterpretation of the legal status of the
corporation. The corporation, Morawetz wrote, "is really an association formed
of a corporation as
by the agreement of its shareholders, and .. .the existence
4' 6
an entity, independently of its members, is a fiction." '
Morawetz treated corporations as virtually indistinguishable from partnerships.
"[T]here is no reason of immediate justice to others, why a number of individuals
should not be permitted to form a corporation of their own free will, and without
first obtaining permission from the legislature, just as they may form a partnership
or enter into ordinary contracts with each other."' 47
General incorporation laws "to a great extent . . . leave the right of forming
a corporation and of acting in a corporate capacity free to all, subject to such
limitations and safeguards as are required for the protection of the public." The
only argument for restricting corporate powers, he claimed, was that notice of limited
liability of shareholders needed to be communicated to potential creditors. "And
this seems to be the chief office of the general incorporation laws which are now
in force nearly everywhere.""'
The source of corporate power was, for Morawetz, in the shareholders. The
principle of majority rule was derived, as in a partnership, from unanimous
shareholder consent. So the majority could not go outside of the purpose specified
in its charter without the unanimity of shareholders. Thus, the doctrine of ultra
vires, originally derived from the grant theory of the corporation, should be replaced
by the requirement of unanimous shareholder agreement, as in a partnership. Regula-

"'

Id. at 48.

,461 V. MORAWETZ, supra note 130, at iii.
"' Id. at 24 (Ist ed. 1882).
48 Id.
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tion of the corporate activity would come, not from the state, but from the
shareholders.
Morawetz' effort to "disaggregate" the corporation into freely contracting
individuals must have seemed at the time the only entirely logical conclusion to
draw in light of the triumph of general incorporation law. It not only dispensed
with an increasingly fictional conception of the corporation as a creature of the
state, it also made it possible to fit corporation law into the now dominant
individualistic mode of private contract law.
The tendency to reconceptualize the corporation along partnership-contractualist
lines continued during the 1880s. In 1884, two years after Morawetz' treatise, Henry
0. Taylor, another New York lawyer, wrote A Treatise on the Law of Private
Corporationswhich was aimed, he said, at "dismissing this fiction" of the "legal
personality" of the corporation, so that "a clearer view" of individual rights and
interests could be determined "without unnecessary mystification." 4 9
Taylor was supported by John Norton Pomeroy, the California lawyer who
was simultaneously putting forth this argument on behalf of the corporation in
the Santa Clara case. Pomeroy emphasized the significance of general incorporation laws in rendering older conceptions of incorporation anachronistic. "The
common-law conception of the 'legal personality' of the metaphysical entity constituting the corporation, entirely distinct from its individual [members], arose at
a time when corporations were all created by special charters," Pomeroy wrote.
All this had changed under general incorporation laws in which "persons complying with a few formal requisites can organize themselves into a company for almost
any business purpose . . . these associations differ very little in their essential

attributes from partnerships."'

150

It is not entirely clear to what extent the legal thinkers who advocated a
partnership-contractualist conception of the corporation during the 1880s were
motivated by any particular political vision or attitude towards corporations. Overtly,
they seemed only to wish to bring corporation law into line with the new reality
of free incorporation. Pomeroy and Justice Field clearly believed that the partnership theory offered the greatest chance of success in protecting the corporation
under the fourteenth amendment. Yet, their individualistic language harkened back
to earlier Jacksonian criticisms of corporations as "special privileges" and
monopolies. And despite the fact that the clear tendency of attacks upon the traditional theory that corporations were creatures of the state was to undermine any
claims to special state control of corporations, the partnership theory was soon
treated as supporting an anti-corporate position.

1,0

H. TAYLOR, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPoRATIONs HAVING CAPITAL
Note, The Legal Idea of a Corporation, 19 AM. L. REv. 114, 115 (1885).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol88/iss2/5

STOCK iV (1884).

32

Horwitz: Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory

1985]

SANTA CLARA

Perhaps that was a correct understanding of its ultimate tendency. For example, Henry 0. Taylor, the New York lawyer and corporate law treatise writer,
appears to have been aware that his effort to dismiss the "fiction" of corporate
personality for producing "unnecessary mystification" might also call into question the legitimacy of limited shareholder liability. Like Chief Justice Taney,' 5 Taylor
observed that limited liability was "the logical outcome of the notion of a corporation as a person, as a subject of rights and liabilities distinct from its members,"' 52
a notion he was doing his best to undermine.
There were many suggestions during the 1890s that a contractual theory might
subvert corporate privileges. Writing in 1892, Dwight A. Jones focused on the
delegitimating tendency of the partnership theory.

mhe main value of a corporate charter arises from the fact that powers and privileges
are thereby acquired which individuals do not possess. It is this that makes the
difference between a business corporation and a partnership. In the former there
is no individual liability ....There is no death ....It is not policy therefore for
a corporation to break down its own independent existence by burying its original
character in the common place privileges of the individual ....Any mingling of
corporate existence of the stockholders will weaken corporate rights.'3
Indeed, opponents of corporate consolidation during the 1890s often advocated
elimination of the corporate form and return to the partnership. One of the most
influential American economists, Henry C. Adams, saw in the extension of the
corporate form the root cause of the growth of economic concentration that was
destroying competitive society. "[T]hese corporations," he wrote in 1894, "assert
for themselves most of the rights conferred on individuals by the law of private
property, and apply to themselves a social philosophy true only of a society composed of individuals who are industrial competitors.""'5 Adams' solution was to
limit the benefits of the corporate form to those "natural monopolies" that could
actually demonstrate "increasing returns" to scale.'
Was there not good reason, then, to suspect that any contractualist theory of
the corporation was only the first step toward attacking the corporate form itself?
In 1900, Christopher G. Tiedeman published his Treatise on State and FederalControl of Personsand Property in the United States,1 6 a greatly expanded and retitl-

",

See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
See H. TAYLOR, supra note 149, at 12.
D. JONES, A CORPORATION AS "A DISTINCT ENTITY," 2 COUNSELLOR 78, 79 (1892).

'"

ADAMS,

"

RELATION OF THE STATE TO INDUSTRIAL ACTION AND ECONOMICS AND JURISPRUDENCE:

Two Essays by Henry Carter Adams (ed. J. Dorfman) intro, essay at 47-48 (1954).
"I ADAMS, SUGGESTIONS FOR A SYSTEM OF TAXATION, Publications of the Michigan Political Science
Ass'n (Ann Arbor, Mich.) 1, no.2, 60 (May, 1894).
6 1 C. TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON STATE AND FEDERAL CONTROL OF PERSONS AND PROPERTY IN
THE UNITED STATES (2d. ed. 1900).
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ed version of his influential Treatise on the Limitation of Police Power (1886).
The later book is filled with the anguish of the old conservative witnessing the
rise of industrial concentration. Tiedeman wrote:
It does not take a very keen observer to note that, for the past fifteen or twenty
years, the tending to the establishment of all-powerful and all-controlling combinations of capital . . . has been increasing year by year in this country. . . .The
rapid accumulation of vast fortunes has inspired some of their possessors with the
desire for the acquisition of power through the control of industries of such great
extension and scope, that they may earn the appellation of kings instead of princes
of industry. If this economic tendency were left unchecked, either by economic
conditions or law, the full fruition of it would be a menace to the liberty of the
individual, and to the stability of the American States as popular governments .... '"
Finally Tiedeman brought the power of incorporation itself into focus.
[A]IIl attempts to suppress and prevent combinations in restraint of trade must
necessarily prove futile, as long as the statutes of the State permit the creation
of private corporations .... The grant of charters of incorporation ... only serves
to intensify the natural power which the capitalist in his individual capacity possesses
over the noncapitalist, by the mere possession of the capital. I advocate, as a return
to a uniform recognition of the constitutional guaranty of equality before the law,
the repeal of the statutes which provide for the creation of private corporations."'
The contractualist view of the corporation as essentially no different from a
partnership began to come under attack from the moment it was presented. Its
most forceful claim was that any entity theory of the corporation was a fictional
and anachronistic carryover from a bygone era of special corporate charters. Yet,
the picture of the corporation as a contract of individual shareholders was itself
becoming a nostalgic fantasy at the very moment the partnership view was most
forcefully put forth.
Some of the contractualists seemed to have in the back of their minds an ideal
of what in a later age would be called "shareholder democracy." But during the
1880s it was beginning to become clear that management, not shareholders, were
the real decision-makers in large publicly owned enterprises.'9 Ironically, Morawetz
published his contractualist theory in the same year as Standard Oil was organized
into the first of the great Trusts. Soon, the "oligarchic" tendency of the Trusts
became a point of standard observation.
During the 1880s, the judicially imposed requirement of shareholder unanimity
for fundamental corporate changes continued to provide the doctrinal foundation
for a "partnership" theory of the corporation. But during the 1890s, several states
including the commercially significant jurisdictions of Delaware, New York, and

Id. at 382-83.
Id. at 609-10.
I'
"'

Shiras, Classification of Corporations,4 YALE L.J. 97, 99-100 (1895).
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New Jersey, passed statutes that overthrew the unanimity rule for corporate conenhanced the power of the
solidations. Many of these statutes also substantially
6
board of directors to initiate such action.' 1
By the time of the First World War, it was common for legal writers to observe
that "the modern stockholder is a negligible factor in the management of a corporation."' 6' "It cannot be too strongly emphasized," another6 "wrote, "that
stockholders today are primarily investors and not proprietors.'
G. The Demise of the Trust Fund Doctrine: The New Relationship
of the Shareholder to (he Corporation
One of the best measures of the shift in the conception of shareholders from
"members" to "investors" in the corporation is the demise of the so-called "Trust
Fund Doctrine" beginning in the 1890s. The demise of the Doctrine was paralleled
by the growth of corporations, diversification in corporate ownership, and the subsequent expansion of the stock market.
The rise of the "natural entity" theory, at the same time, presented a picture
of the corporation that legitimated the Doctrine's demise.
The origin of the Doctrine goes back to Justice Story's celebrated opinion in
Wood v. Dummer'63 (1824) declaring that the capital stock of a corporation was
a trust fund for the benefit of corporate creditors. Its central significance was to
make the stockholders of an insolvent corporation liable for their failure to pay
6
the full or par value of any stock to which they subscribed from a corporation.' "
This question of the extent of shareholder liability for "watered stock"-stock issued
for less than par value-represented one of the two or three most important issues
in corporate law during the late nineteenth century and generated hundreds of cases
and thousands of pages of legal writing.
Accusations of widespread corporate fraud and financial manipulation focused
on the "watered stock" question. And amid the wreckage of the 1893 Depression,
judges and legal writers faced the fact that enforcement of the Trust Fund Docthe innocent and unsettled hundreds of millions of dollars
trine had "punished
65
of investments."'

App. 290, 294-95 (1906).
Beardstown Pearl Button Co. v. Oswald, 130 I11.
HENDERSON, supra note 67, at 169.
j. CARTER, THE NATURE OF THE CORPORATION AS A LEGAL ENTITY 160 (1919).
J+'
613Wood v. Dummer, 3 Mason 308, 30 Fed. Cas. 435 (1824). The Supreme Court adopted the
Trust Fund Doctrine in Sawyer v. Hoag, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 610 (1873).
I6 A second question was whether, in the absence of a national bankruptcy law, the Trust Fund
Doctrine prevented an insolvent corporation from exercising a preference about the order in which
it paid its creditors, since it was concededly legal for an insolvent individual to exercise such discretion.
"' 1 W. CooK, supra note 60, at vii.
60

161G.
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In one case, prior to the Depression, the United States Supreme Court held
stockholders liable on "watered stock" more than twenty-five years after the company failed.', In observing the changes that the Depression had produced, William
W. Cook wrote: "Corporation ruin has created corporation law.""'6
1. History of Limited Shareholder Liability
It is not usually appreciated that truly limited shareholder liability was far from
the norm in America even as late as 1900.168 Though by the time of the Civil War
the common law had evolved to the point of presuming limited shareholder liability
in the absence of any legislative rule, in fact most states had enacted constitutional
or statutory provisions holding shareholders of an insolvent corporation liable for
more than the value of their shares. The most typical provision, which first appeared in the 1848 New York statute providing for general incorporation of manufacturing companies,' 6 9 imposed "double liability" on shareholders. By the end of
the nineteenth century, this provision "ha[d] been copied, in its essential features,
in almost every State in the Union."' 7 1 Many other constitutional or statutory enactments imposed even more extensive potential liability on shareholders.' 7 As a result,
the distinction between the liability of the "members" of a corporation and a partnership, so clear to modern eyes, was still regarded rather as a matter of degree
than of kind throughout the nineteenth century. And even within the strictest of
limited liability jurisdictions, the Trust Fund Doctrine promulgated by courts made
innocent shareholders potentially liable for the difference between the par value
and the purchase price of their shares.
When the Doctrine came under attack during the 1890s, its defenders emphasized
that its main function was to protect creditors who had a right to suppose that
the stated capital stock of a corporation reflected its real value. For a corporation

' Hawkins v. Glenn, 131 U.S. 319 (1889); Glenn v. Liggett, 135 U.S. 533 (1890); Glenn v. Taussig,
135 U.S. 533 (1890); Pincoffs, Corporations: Capital Stock A Trust Fund For Creditors,26 AM. U.L.
Rav. 100, 102 (1892).
1 W. COOK, supra note 60, at v (4th ed. 1898).
The emphasis in histories of limited shareholder liability has been on identifying the periods
in which shareholder liability to creditors of an insolvent corporation diverged from unlimited partnership liability. From this perspective, any limitation on otherwise unlimited liability is significant. See,
e.g., Dodd, The Evolution of Limited Liability in American Industry: Massachusetts, 61 HARV. L.
REy. 1351, 1379 (1948) (identifying when the American common law diverged from England and assumed
limited liability as the norm in the absence of a legislative provision for liability). As a result, scholars
have tended to underemphasize the fact that, in most jurisdictions throughout the nineteenth century,
the usual statutory provision made the shareholder liable for much more than-normally twice-the
vilue of his shares.
,691848 N.Y. Laws, ch. 40.
"
1 W. CooK, supra note 60, at 203-06.
'"
See 3 S. THompsoN, supra note 35, at chs. 46, 50 (Ist ed. 1895).
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to sell shares at discount was, they argued, a fraud on subsequent creditors. But
unlike its original "partnership" rationale this argument for the Trust Fund Doctrine already conceded that corporations were separate entities and that the
stockholders were only investors, not owners, managers, or members of a corporation. If the Trust Fund Doctrine was simply designed to give notice to protect
creditors, the Doctrine's opponents replied, it can only apply to subsequent creditors
since existing creditors could not have relied on a subsequent issue of watered stock.
By degrees, courts beginning in the 1890s gradually eroded the Trust Fund Doctrine. One of the most important immediate influences in producing the change
was the rise of a national stock market, which definitively converted shareholders
into impersonal investors. Yet, this was only the culmination of a long-term transformation by which shareholders, once regarded as "members" of a corporation, not
fundamentally different from partners, came to be treated as completely separate
from the corporate entity itself.
2. The Structural Transformation of the Corporation
In order to comprehend the changes in legal doctrine during the 1890s, we
should first understand the dramatic changes in the structure of the business
corporation as well as the market for stock that took place during the 1880-1900
period.
The major changes were in the size and scale of industrial companies. Before
1890, only railroads constituted "large, well-established, widely known enterprises
with securities traded on organized stock exchanges, while industrials, though
numerous, were small, scattered, closely owned, and commonly regarded as
unstable."' 72 Most of the manufacturing enterprises of the 1880s have been described
as "small" companies, with net worth under $2 million. For the sake of comparison,
there were extremely few "very large" companies worth more than $10 million,
and even enterprises classified as "large" (worth between $5 million and $10 million)
were also "fairly rare."' 7 3 By contrast, "each of the country's ten largest railroads
had more than $100 million of net worth and the largest of them all, the Penn74
sylvania Railroad, had over $200 million."'
In manufacturing, "the partnership form of organization predominated...
.Where enterprises were incorporated, and, therefore, had outstanding securities,
these were generally held by
a small group of persons and were infrequently offered
75
public."'1
the
to
sale
for

1"2

Navin & Sears, The Rise of a Market for IndustrialSecurities, 1887-1902, 29 Bus. HIST. REv.

105, 106 (1955).
Id. at 109.
' Id. at 109 n.4.
I" at 109.
Id.
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Most of the leading manufacturing companies were family-owned. Even two
of the "very large" companies, Singer Manufacturing and McCormick Harvesting
Machine, were controlled by and had a majority of their stock owned by the family. And Andrew Carnegie's combined steel interests, which constituted among the
very largest of manufacturing enterprises, were organized as closely owned partnerships until they converted to the corporate form in 1892. ' 11
Nearly all of the distributive enterprises-wholesalers like Marshall Field in
Chicago, R. H. Macy's in New York, and John Wanamaker in Philadelphia-were
organized as partnerships as were companies in gold mining and oil drilling. And
while the processing branch of industry-oil refining, sugar refining, lead smeltingwas the first category in which large-scale publicly owned enterprises (besides
railroads) developed during the 1880s, the meat processing giants, Swift and Armour,
retained the partnership form well into the 1880s.
Before 1890 a man with excess capital to invest was likely to put his money into
real estate. If he chose to buy securities, he had a relatively narrow range from
which to select. The principal type of security investment was in railroading. Industrial securities, except in the coal and textile industries, were almost unknown.'
Those industrial securities that did exist were usually exchanged only in "direct
person-to-person sales."' 1 8 Between 1890 and 1893, however, industrials began to
be listed on the Stock Exchange and to be traded by leading brokerage houses.
And only after 1897, in the midst of the merger movement, did companies publicly
offer shares of stock, replacing the system of "private" subscriptions that had
prevailed throughout the nineteenth century. It is perhaps at this moment that we
can clearly identify the beginning of the shift away from "the traditional point
of view" of shareholders as "the ultimate owners, the corporate equivalent of part79
ners and proprietors."'

3.

The Overthrow

When Seymour Thompson published his six-volume treatise on corporation law
in 1895, he lamented the fact that the Trust Fund Doctrine had only recently "been
greatly modified" by American courts-"so much so, that it may now be doubted
whether the capital of a corporation is a trust fund for its creditors in any different
sense than the sense in which the property of a private person is a trust fund for
80
his creditors."
Beginning in 1887, the New York Court of Appeals overthrew the Trust Fund

116

Id. at 109-10.

Id. at 106.
Id. at 137.
" A.A. FREEDRICH, Stocks and Stock Ownership, 14 Encyclopedia of Social Sciences 403 (1937).
IOI S. THOMPSON, supra note 35, at vii (1st ed. 1895).
"

"'
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Doctrine.' 8 ' And, in a widely followed opinion, the Minnesota high court held in
1892 that only fraud could permit a creditor to recover against a holder of "watered
stock." 8 The most important consequence of this shift to a fraud theory was that
in a majority of jurisdictions only subsequent creditors-those who presumably
had relied on representations about the capital stock of the corporation-could
sue on, "watered stock."' 8 3
But the most controversial departures from the Trust Fund Doctrine appeared
in a series of cases decided by the United States Supreme Court in 1891 through
1893. In the leading case of Handley v. Stutz" (1891), the high court, while purporting to reaffirm the Trust Fund Doctrine, distinguished between the original
subscription to corporate shares, to which traditional trust fund shareholder liability
applied, and a subsequent issue of shares at a discount by a "going concern,"
which created nonliability. Even Seymour Thompson conceded that where an
established corporation "finds itself in urgent need" of money, "it would be a
hard and perhaps a mischievous rule that would prevent it from reselling the shares
at their market value."8' Yet, he protested that, taken together, Supreme Court
decisions had "overturn[ed] all former rulings" of the Supreme Court and "totally
obliterat[ed]"' 86 the Trust Fund Doctrine.
Handley v. Stutz and companion cases provided the opportunity for those who
wished to attack the Trust Fund Doctrine. In its different treatment of the original
and subsequent stock issues, wrote George Wharton Pepper, the Supreme Court
had undertaken "the impossible task of distinguishing on principle between the
status of two sets of stockholders."' 87 Based on the Court's decisions, he concluded, the Trust Fund Doctrine "is neither a theory nor a doctrine."',8
The seeming incoherence of the Court's distinction between the liability of different classes of shareholders encouraged advocacy of the more restricted fraud
theory of liability.'" Indeed, between 1891 and 1893, the Supreme Court itself
Christensen v. Eno, 106 N.Y. 97, 102, 12 N.E. 648 (1887); Southworth v. Morgan, 205 N.Y.

"'

293, 93 N.E. 490 (1912); Jeffrey v. Selwyn, 220 N.Y. 77, 115 N.E. 275 (1917). See generally W. CooK,
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS HAVING A CAPITAL STOCK (4th ed. 1898).
i2 Hospes v. Northwestern Mfg. Co., 48 Minn. 174, 50 N.W. 1117 (1892).
Ballantine, Stockholders Liability in Minnesota, 7 MINN. L. REv. 79, 88 (1923); Note, The
Nature of the Stockholder'sLiabilityfor Stock Issued at a Discount, 29 HARV. L. REV. 854, 856 (1916).
"' Handley v. Stutz, 139 U.S. 417 (1891). See also Clark v. Bever, 139 U.S. 96 (1891); Fogg
v. Blair, 139 U.S. 118 (1891).
"'
2 S. THOMPSON, supra note 35, at 1295 (1st ed. 1895).
"'
Id. at 1296.

, Pepper, Recent Development of CorporationLaw by the Supreme Court of the United States
11, 34 Am. LAW REG. 448, 457 n.2 (1895).
"'

Id. at 456. See also Pepper, The "Trust Fund Theory" of the CapitalStock of a Corporation,

32 AM. LAW REG. 175 (2d sev.) 6 (1893).

L.

"I See, e.g., Harriman, CorporateAssets as a "Trust Fundfor the Benefit of Creditors," 3 N.W.
Is Unpaid Capital a Trust Fund in Any ProperSense?, 25 AM.

REV. 115, 206 (1894); McMurtrie,

L. REV. 749 (1891).
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wavered between theological reaffirmation of the Trust Fund Theory and statements
that went to the verge of overruling the Doctrine.' 9
The root of the problem was that the relationship of the shareholder to the
corporation had begun fundamentally to change during the 1890s. "[T]he liability
of the stockholder to pay in full for his stock was an obligation placed upon him
because of his relation to the corporation." Under "the traditional point of view,"
the shareholders were "the ultimate owners, the corporate equivalent of partners
and proprietors."' 9
But as the market for shares widened, the relation of the shareholders to the
corporation began to be redefined. For example, one of the major limitations on
the Trust Fund Doctrine began to take shape even before Handley v. Stutz was
decided. Was a subsequent bona fide purchaser of "watered stock" liable to
creditors? No, answered the influential jurist, John F. Dillon in an 1879 railroad
stock case. "Millions of dollars of stocks are sold in this country every week,"
Dillon wrote, "and there is no practice on the part of purchasers, and no understanding that the law requires of them that they shall ascertain . . . that certificates
of full-paid stock have, in fact, been fully paid. . . .Besides, on what principle
is it that a purchaser of the company's shares is to be held to be the guardian
of the rights of the company's creditors and bound to protect them?"',"
As the marketing of corporate shares moved away from formal "private"
subscriptions, the meaningfulness of the Supreme Court's distinction between original
and subsequent issues of stock began to collapse. So too, as Judge Dillon had suggested, the difference between bona fide purchasers of original and subsequent
shares. "Certificates of stock have become such important factors in trade and
credit, and general investment by all classes," wrote William W. Cook in 1898,
"that the law is steadily tending towards the complete protection of a bona fide
purchaser of them in open market. . . .The constant tendency of the courts to
increase the negotiability of certificates of stock will probably establish the rule
that the purchaser in good faith of a certificate of stock is not liable on any unpaid
subscription price thereof, unless such liability is stated on the face of the certificate
itself. Indeed, even now this may be said to be the established rule."'"
9I Compare Camden v. Stuart, 144 U.S. 104 (1892) with Hollins v. Brierfield Coal & Iron Co.,
150 U.S. 371 (1893). See Pepper, supra note 187, at 450.
...Note, supra note 183, at 856.
"' Steacy v. Little Rock Railroad, 5 Dill. 348, 373-74, 22 F. Cas. 1142, 1152 (E.D. Ark. 1879)
(No. 13,329).
',

I W.

COOK,

supranote 60, at 498 n.1, (4th ed. 1898). This idea first appeared inCook's treatise,

Section 257, n.2, as early as 1889 (2d ed.), except that he predicted that "some time hereafter" the
rule of full negotiability would be established. The statement in the text, from the third edition (1895),
was the first to declare it as "the established rule." By the eighth edition in 1923, Cook eliminated
the statement that it had already become the "established rule," and simply cited cases for the proposi-

tion that it was "the better opinion, and the one most in accord with the usages and demands of trade."
2 W. CooK, supra note iii at 854, section 257 n.2.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol88/iss2/5
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With the development of investment banking after 1900, even the marketing
of original shares of corporate stock no longer entailed a formal relationship between the corporation and a subscriber. The original investor who purchased shares
in the market for less than par value now was in a position no different from the
subsequent bona fide purchaser whom courts had already been protecting against
creditors.' 94
The establishment of a complete market for stock thus made an anachronism
of the Trust Fund Doctrine. Indeed, New York in 1912 and Delaware in 1917 permitted the issue of stock without par value, and by 1924 thirty-four states had
followed suit. 95 The Delaware law "in effect though not in form . . . cut off the
creditors' remedy of shareholders' liability" when stock was issued for property
or services. 96 By 1925, James C. Bonbright noted "that many lawyers with a long
and extensive practice in corporation cases have never had a single suit involving
a shareholder's liability on watered stock." 9 7 Little more than a generation earlier,
by contrast, such suits had been the stock in trade of legal writing on corporation
law.
When the Trust Fund Doctrine first came under attack during the 1890s, George
Wharton Pepper noted that "many fundamental questions in regard to the legal
status of corporations are still unsettled .... [I]t may be doubted whether any six
learned judges would to-day give explanations even substantially similar of the dif98
ference between corporations and joint stock companies or statutory partnerships."
Indeed, as Pepper noted, one of the theories that might make the Trust Fund Doctrine coherent was a partnership theory, "the view that the corporation is identical
with the members that compose it.... " ",99 But the tendency of courts to distinguish
between prior and subsequent purchasers of "watered stock"-a shift from the
trust fund to the fraud doctrine-had already begun to erode such a conception.
When George Wharton Pepper introduced Maitland's work on Gierke to an
American audience in 1901, he was quick to notice that a natural entity theory
of the corporation made the Trust Fund Doctrine "unnecessary." ' And a year
later, a critic of the Doctrine charged the Supreme Court with "refus[al] to accept
corporation, which meant, he believed,
the consequences" of an entity theory of the
20
overthrow of the Trust Fund Doctrine. '

19,See Navin & Sears, supra note 172, at 137-38 (8th ed. 1923).
I W. CooK, supra note 60, at 291 n.4, 5; Bonbright, The Dangers of Shares Without Par

Value, 24 COL. L. REV. 449, 458 (1924).
Bonbright, supra note 195, at 460.
,0, Id. at 432.
'9'

' Pepper, Recent Development of CorporationLaw by the Supreme Court of the United States
I, 34 Am. LAw REG. at 296 (1895).
'"

Pepper, supra note 187, at 453.

o Pepper, A Brief Introduction to the Study of the Law of Associations, 40 Am. LAW REG.
255, 267 (o.s.) 49 (1901).
20, Hunt, The Trust Fund Theory and Some Substitutes For It, 12 YALE L.J. 63, 67 (1902).
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The natural entity theory of the corporation thus emerged at virtually the same
moment as the Trust Fund Doctrine began to collapse. As we have seen, one of
the major organizing premises of the natural entity theory was to posit the existence of a sharp distinction between the corporate entity and the shareholders.
It was precisely this picture that ultimately subverted the coherence of the Trust
Fund Doctrine.

H.

The Corporate Entity and the Power of Directors

At some point at the beginning of the twentieth century, American legal opinion
began decisively to shift to the view that "the powers of the board of directors
. . .are identical with the powers of the corporation. 2 0 2 Earlier, the dominant
view, as expressed by the United States Supreme Court, was that "when the charter
was silent, the ultimate determination of the management of the corporate affairs
rests with its stock holders. ' 20 3 "The law," said one federal court in 1881,
"recognizes the stockholders as the ultimately controlling power in the corporation. . ,,,o0
But modern corporate legislation, passed during the first quarter of
the twentieth century, ratified a new "absolutism" that courts themselves had already
begun to bestow upon corporate directors. " 5
Writing in 1895, Seymour Thompson identified "three radically different
views ' 2 0 6 that were still entertained by courts and legal thinkers concerning the
nature and limits of the powers of corporate directors.
1. That the directors, being chosen representatives of the corporation, constitute,
for all purposes of dealing with others, the corporation itself- hence, that within
the scope of the objects and purpose of the corporation they have all the powers
of the corporation itself. 2. That the directors have all the powers of generalagents
in the management of corporate affairs. 3. That they have only the powers of
special agents....207
In an early Supreme Court case involving the Bank of the United States, the
Court, per Justice Story, had clearly rejected, over a dissent by Chief Justice Marshall, the first, most expansive, definition of the powers of directors.2 00 "In ordinary
business corporations," Thompson concluded, "the powers of the board of directors . . . fall far short of being co-equal with the powers of the corporation." ' 9

202

H.

SPELLMAN, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF LAW GOVERNING CORPORATE DIRECTIONS

237

(1931).
1*1Union Pacific R.R. v. Chicago R.R., 163 U.S. 564, 596 (1896).
10,Cass v. Manchester Iron & Steel Co., 9 F. 640, 642 (W.D. Pa. 1881).
205 H. SPELLMAN, supra 202, at 6 n.24.
206 3 S.THOMPSON, supra note 35, at 2878 (1st ed. 1895).
207

Id. at 2878-79.

200 Bank of the U.S. v. Dandridge, 25 U.S.
209 3 S.THOMPSON, supra note 35, at 2881.

64, 76, 78, 114-15 (1827).
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In England, the judges had limited the directors' powers even further by classifying
them within the most restrictive category of special agents. "On the whole," Thompson concluded, "judicial theory, at least in America, greatly preponderates in favor
of the proposition that the directors of a business corporation are its general or
managing agents." 2 t
The classification of directors as agents itself underwent some important changes.
The leading antebellum treatise on corporation law, by Angell and Ames, best reflects
the earlier understanding of the limited legal position of the board of directors
in the corporation. Whereas Judge Thompson's 1895 treatise devoted almost 500
pages to the legal status of directors, there is not even a separate chapter on the
subject in the 1861 edition of Angell and Ames. Their discussion of directors is
scattered throughout a chapter on "Agents of Corporations," which indiscriminately
lumps together officers and directors. They confidently declared that, in the absence
of any contrary legal provisions, "the power to appoint officers and agents rests,
of course, like every other power, in the body of the corporators" or shareholders. t '"
And, most importantly, they announced the widely held view that directors have
no inherent power "to appoint subagents to contract for the corporation . . . and
accordingly contracts made by such subagents will not be binding on the corporation." ' 2'
In his 1877 treatise on corporation law, George W. Field observed that it was
"usual" for corporations to confer the authority for managing the business "upon
a limited number of the members usually called directors or managers, who act,
in most respects .. .as agents for and in place of the corporation, and of the
stockholders." In the absence of any other legal provision, wrote Field, "it is evident, on general principles, that the corporators [stockholders] would possess such
power." ' 3 However, when in 1897 Professor Ernst Freund addressed the question
of whether the relation between the board of directors and "the members at large
of the corporation" was the same as or different from "that of principal and agent,"
he concluded that "both views have found judicial support." 2? ' While Freund saxv
that the agency analogy broke down to the extent that a majority shareholder resolution could not supersede the managing authority of the board, he did insist that,
logically, unanimous shareholder action was the ultimate authority in the corporation. Indeed, Freund seemed to have endorsed "the view that the members at large
are the true and ultimate holders of the corporate rights." 215
The judicial reaction to the idea that corporate directors, being agents, could
not delegate their powers to subagents is perhaps the best litmus test for identifying
210

Id. at 2881-82.

& AMES, supra note 129, at 257.
See also 3 S.THOMPSON, supra note 35, at 2862-63.
213 G. FIELD, LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (1877).
2,1 ANGELL

2,2 Id.

2l4E. FREUND, supra note 32, at 53.

/d.at 48.
I'

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1986

43

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 88, Iss. 2 [1986], Art. 5
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 88

the changing legal status of directors. Only in the early twentieth century did courts
widely assert that, because the directors were "the primary possessors of all the
powers which the charter confers," the board's powers were therefore "original
and undelegated" and hence could be conferred upon agents.' "
The leading twentieth century treatise on the power of corporate directors was
written to reflect this shift in legal opinion. "The enlargement of facilities for the
purchase and sale of corporate securities," wrote Howard Holton Spellman in 1931,
"the tendency toward combinations of corporations, and the consequent desirability
of diversification of individual investments have joined to create a class of
stockholders who regard themselves as investors rather than coentrepreneurs.... Accordingly, modern decisions tend toward an emphasis of the
directors' absolutism in the management of the affairs of large corporations; the
board of directors has achieved a super-control of corporate management and of
the corporation's legal relations ... .))217
This shift in the internal constitution of the corporation was among the most
important reasons for the demise of the partnership-contract theory of the corporation after 1900. Ernst Freund's "representation" theory of the corporation,
for example, was directly dependent on "the view that the members at large are
the true and ultimate holders of the corporate rights." ' 8 In 1897, Freund could
still suppose that the realities of internal corporate organization could support such
a theory. Yet, he already saw that "where the whole sum of corporate powers is
vested by law directly in a board of directors ... such an organization ... allows
us to see in a large railroad, banking or insurance corporation rather an aggregation of capital than an association of persons. "239

I.

The Natural Entity Theory

For orthodox legal writers of the 1880s, it still seemed sufficient to quote John
Marshall's view of the corporation as an "artificial entity" in order to combat
the partnership theory. They could also cite an abundance of Supreme Court ultra
vires decisions which continued to treat the corporation as a creature of the state.
216 Manson v. Curtis, 223 N.Y. 313, 322, 119 N.E. 558, 562 (1918). H. SPELLMAN, supra note
202, at 9-12. The leading case on the subject became Hoyt v. Thompson's Exec., 19 N.Y. 207 (1859),
which was largely ignored by the New York courts until it later became a favorite "old" citation for

recognizing plenary power in the board of directors. See Beveridge v. New York Elevated Railroad
Co., 112 N.Y. 1, 22-23 (1889); People ex rel. Manice v. Powell, 201 N.Y. 194, 200 (1911); Manson,
223 N.Y. at 322, 119 N.E. at 562. A second early favorite, frequently cited in the twentieth

century, was an opinion by Chief Justice Shaw in Burrill v. Nahant Bank, 43 Mass. 163 (1804). More
typical cases reflecting the early view of directors as agents who could not delegate their powers are
Mechanics Bank v. New York & New Haven Railroad Co., 22 N.Y. 258, 295 (1860) (opinion of Selden,
J.); Brokaw v. New Jersey Railroad Co., 32 N.J.L. 328, 332 (1867).
217 H. SPELLMAN, supra note 202, at 4-5.
228 E. FREUND, supra note 32, at 58.
219 Id. at 60.
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Above all, the artificial entity theory stood in the way of corporate consolidation. For those who, like Arthur Eddy, wished to argue that "corporations have
the same power to acquire property as has an individual, ' 22 0 it was essential that
the artificial entity theory be overthrown. For Eddy, theories such as that of the
New York Court of Appeals in the celebrated Sugar Trust Case, amounted to "a
positive restriction of that liberty which is guaranteed by free institutions." The
New York court had written:
It is not a sufficient answer to say that similar results may be lawfully accomplished; that an individual having the necessary wealth might have bought all these
sugar refineries, manned them with his own chosen agents, and managed them as
a group, at his sovereign will; for it is one thing for the state to respect the rights
of ownership and protect them out of regard to the business freedom of the citizen,
and quite another thing to add to that possibility a further extension of those consequences by creating artificial persons to aid in producing such aggregations. The
individuals are few who hold in possession such enormous wealth, and fewer still
who peril it all in a manufacturing enterprise; but if corporations can combine
and mass their forces in a solid trust or partnership, with little added risk to the
capital already embarked, without limit to the magnitude of the aggregation, a
tempting and easy road is opened to enormous combinations, vastly exceeding in
number and strength and in their power over industry any possibilities of individual
ownership; and the state, by the creation of the artificial persons constituting the
elements of the combination ...

becomes itself the responsible creator, the volun-

tary cause, of an aggregation of capital which it simply endures in the individual
as the product of his free agency. What it may bear is one thing; what it should
cause and create is quite another. 2 '
During the 1890s, one finds a growing movement to attack this "artificial entity"
theory of the corporation. Perhaps the original appeal of the contractualists to
the underlying meaning of general incorporation laws had begun to sink in. Or,
perhaps, the casual declaration by the Supreme Court in 1886 that the business
corporation was a "person" under the fourteenth amendment was beginning to
have an effect, though the real significance of that doctrine was still in the future.
More probably, the phenomenal migration of corporations to New Jersey after
1889 made legal thinkers finally see that, in fact as well as in theory, corporations
could do virtually anything they wanted to. The literature of the 1890s on the
inevitability of concentrated enterprise reflected this new reality by emphasizing
for the first time the epiphenomenal nature of legal forms.
Beginning in the 1890s and reaching a high point around 1920, there is a vir' 22
tual obsession in the legal literature with the question of corporate "personality.
Over and over again, legal writers attempted to find a vocabulary that would enable
A. EDDY, supra note 114, at 602.
New York v. North River Sugar Refinery, 121 N.Y. 582, 625 (1890).
222 See, e.g., W. Jethro Brown, The Personality of the Corporation and the State, 21 L.Q.R.
365 (1905).
220 1
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them to describe the corporation as a "real" or "natural" entity whose existence
is prior to and separate from the state. What the contractualists first tried to express,
with only the vocabulary and concepts of natural rights individualism then available
to them, the entity theorists completed.
Along with the contractualists, they sought to represent the corporation as
entirely separate from the state and therefore really "private." Contrary to the
contractualists, they insisted that groups were just as "real" as individuals and
that, in addition, the corporation was separate and distinct from its shareholders.
The earliest group of these "natural entity" theorists, writing in ignorance both
of Gierke and Maitland, simply repeated over and over again that the corporation
was not fictional, but "real," and that it was a "fact" like any other holder of
rights. 2 3 Corporations were "autonomous, self-sufficient and self-renewing
bod[ies]," and "they may determine and enforce their common will." "[N]either
2
the group nor its functions is created by the state." "
The most brilliant of these early efforts to express the reality of groups was
University of Chicago Professor Ernst Freund's The Legal Nature of Corporations
(1897). Influenced by the work of Gierke on the nature of the corporation, Freund
sought to translate Gierke's Hegelian analysis for a practical-minded and antimetaphysical American Bar.
For Freund, the basic conflict was between the fiction theory, which denied
the idea of a distinct legal personality in the corporation, and the organic theory,
propounded by many German jurists, "who insist that the distinctiveness of the
corporate personality is as real as the individuality of a physical person."2' The
proponents of the fiction theory, by contrast, argued that a corporate entity "is
nothing but the sum of its parts," '26 ultimately reducible to the reality of individual
wills.
Running through Freund's argument is the effort to overcome the traditional
private law emphasis on the individual character of legal rights. "If the individual,
private and beneficial right is to measure and govern all rules relating to rights
of whatsoever nature, then the corporate right will continue to be abnormal and
illogical." 2 7 On the other hand, the organic theory was "illusory" in encouraging
"the impression that . . . corporate personality possesses an absolute unity and
distinctiveness .. .,"2 Its emphasis on the psychological cohesiveness and organic

unity of groups did not really describe the business corporation, whose members
were "without any noticeable psychological connection" even though they "may

"'

D. JONES, supra note 153, at 80-81.
Davis, The Nature of Corporations, 12 POL. Sci. Q. 273, 278 (1897).
E. FREUND, supra note 32, at 13.

at 11.
Id. at 48.
Id. at 51.
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easily exercise common rights." 2 9 Above all, German organicist theory had lost
itself "in metaphysical speculations and refined distinctions of little substantial
'
value." 230
Between individualism and organicism, Freund presented a theory of "representation," which portrayed the corporation as a representative democracy governed
by majority rule. When "we speak of an act or an attribute as corporate, it is
not corporate in the psychologically collective sense, but merely representative, and
imputed to the corporation for reasons of policy and convenience. "231
But Freund acknowledged the radical break with individualism he was proposing for corporate theory. He was, after all, attempting to justify the power of the
corporate majority to bind the minority.
That each person should fully answer for all his acts, and should not answer for
the acts of others, is indeed a maxim of extraordinary importance, and it seems
to be violated in the admission of representative action not resting upon express
delegation. Against this it can only be urged that the maxim without modification
is unjustifiable, because it antagonizes or prevents the full protection of joint
interests, which, as we have seen, demand representation. The foundation of all

liability upon principles of moral responsibility is a legal conception \vhich may
be carried to excessive lengths; even if fully justified where liability is penal and

the moral quality of the act is of the essence of its legal aspect, it may be inadeconflicting interests in accordance
quate where it is simply a question of adjusting
22
with prevailing ideas of justice and equity.
Yet, as with the earlier contractual theorists, Freund had his greatest difficulty
in accounting for the oligarchic tendencies that were already becoming dominant
within the large corporation. Many statutes vested corporate powers directly in the
board of directors, he noted. At that point, he acknowledged, "corporate capacity
would thereby be shifted from the members at large to the governing body ....

Such

an organization reduces the personal cohesion between the [shareholders] to a
minimum, and allows us to see in a large railroad, banking or insurance corporation rather an aggregation of capital than an association of persons." '33
At the very moment, then, at which Freund sought to derive the corporate
personality from majority rule of the shareholders, the corporate entity itself was
becoming virtually independent of the shareholders. It required a still more abstract
justification of corporate personality, divorced entirely from any pretense that,
ultimately, the shareholders ruled.
Two years after Freund wrote, Henry Williams attempted that justification.
In an article in the American Law Register, he asserted that shareholders "possess
229

Id.

110Id. at preface, 5.
2"' Id. at 52.
232
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1, Id. at 59-60.
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whatever" in a corporation. Even in the case

of dissolution, "when their actual legal rights first accrue," shareholders' rights
were "entirely subsidiary" to creditors. "The stockholders," he concluded, "are
'
in the position of the heirs, or next of kin or residuary legatees of a living person." 234
In the flood of articles on corporate personality after the turn of the century,
legal writers continued to reinforce the notion that a group must be treated as "an
organic whole . . . which cannot be analyzed into the mere sum of its parts." 2"
The corporation, these writers insisted, was a "real" entity, a "fact," not a "fic' University of Chicago Law
tion." 236
Professor Arthur W. Machen summed up these
views in an influential 1911 article, emphasizing "the naturalness and indeed inevitableness of the conception of a corporation as an entity."
In these days it has become fashionable to inveigh against the doctrine that a corporation is an entity, as a mere technicality and a relic of the Middle Ages; but
nothing could be further from the truth. A corporation is an entity-not imaginary
or fictitious, but real, not artificial but natural. "37

Following the inevitability theorists, Machen underlined the new view that the
corporation existed prior to law. "All that the law can do is to recognize, or refuse
to recognize, the existence of this entity. The law can no more create such an entity
than it can create a house out of a collection of loose bricks ... "I"
What was the political significance of the thousands of pages devoted to the
question of corporate personality? The argument between entity and contractual
theorists during the 1880s and 1890s was, at bottom, a conflict over whether the
individual or group was the appropriate unit of economic, political, and legal
analysis. Some contractualists were openly hostile to big business and offered the
partnership model as an alternative to the corporate form, to which they ascribed
most of the evils of consolidation and monopoly. But other contractualists were
not so much opposed to the corporation as they were to its oligarchic tendencies.
Contractualism was, for them, a way of reasserting the primacy of shareholder
control.
In one important respect, contractualism prepared the way for the triumph
of the natural entity theory. Reasoning from individualist premises so prominent
in the decades immediately after the Civil War, the contractualists were the first
to see the anomalous character of the "artificial entity" theory of the corporation,
not only because it clashed with the underlying spirit of general incorporation laws,
but also because of its hostility to any theory of natural rights. Every bit as much
as the natural entity theorists, the contractualists worked from a conception of

Williams, An Inquiry into the Natureand Law of Corporations,38 AM. L. REG. (n.5) 1,3 (1899).

Brown, supra note 222, at 379.
RAYMOND, THE GENESIS OF THE CORPORATION 216 (1906).
237 Machen, Corporate Personality, 24 HARv. L. REV. 253, 261-62 (1911).
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property as existing prior to the state. By contrast, the artificial entity theory
represented a standing reminder of the social creation of property rights.
The main effect of the natural entity theory of the business corporation was
to legitimate large scale enterprise and to destroy any special basis for state regulation of the corporation that derived from its creation by the state. Indeed, the demise
both of the ultra vires doctrine as well as of constitutional restrictions on foreign
corporations was an expression of the triumph of the natural entity theory. An
entity theory was also helpful for advocating even more limited shareholder liability
while justifying the growing irrelevance of the shareholders in the modern business
corporation. Finally, it obliterated the claim that corporate mergers were different
from individual acquisitions of property.
In their emphasis on corporate "personality," early natural entity adherents
attempted simply to capitalize on the language of natural rights individualism by
portraying the corporation as just another right-bearing person. Most later progressive legal thinkers, however, followed Ernst Freund's more "realistic" effort,
dismissing the idea of corporate "personality" as merely a "metaphor." But the
progressives were at one in seeking to demonstrate the "real" and "natural"
character of corporations.
If the natural entity theory arose to legitimate emerging large scale enterprise,
it became in the hands of Progressive thinkers a way of being realistic about social
and economic trends. Large corporations were here to stay, and, as one of the
ablest Progressive legal writers, Gerard Henderson, put it in 1918, the natural entity
theory "looks upon a corporation . .. as a normal business unit, and its legal
personality as no more than a convenient mechanism of commerce and
industry .... [T]he material basis is the growing internationalism of business, of
trade, of investment. 23 9
By the time Henderson wrote, Progressives had struggled to emancipate
themselves from legal conceptions rooted in natural rights individualism. If the
central goal of earlier natural entity theorists had been to extend the natural rights
of individuals to the corporate "personality," the Progressives instead sought to
show that all rights, both corporate and personal, were entirely the creature of
the state. "When we speak of a corporation being the subject of rights," Henderson wrote, "we mean that it has the capacity to enter into legal relations-to make
contracts, own property, bring suits. Rights, in this sense, are pure creatures of
the law. . . .There is no reason, except the practical one, why, as some one has
suggested, the law should not accord to the last rose of summer a legal right not
240
to be plucked.
Thus, the "corporate device" was "not an expression of any philosophic quality
in the group-of any group will or group organism. It is no more than a conve:39
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nient technical device ...to achieve the practical results desired, of unity to action,
continuity of policy [and] limited liability ... "I"
Both the "fictional" and the "realist" schools had unnecessarily assumed that
only "persons" could be the bearers of legal rights, Henderson argued. "The
assumption that a person alone can be the subject of rights is based on the conception of a right as a philosophic entity, springing out of the nature of man, independent of the law and anterior to it. ' 24 2 This view, "modern jurisprudence has very
generally rejected.' '243
Henderson echoed Pound in arguing that there were, in fact, not "rights" but
"interests." '2 4' Thus, the "practical" recognition of the corporate entity in no way
implied special privileges or protections for corporations. "The social purposes for
which legislation may override private interests are of the broadest sort, and fortunately their scope is constantly growing .... All legislation must be tested ...

by

the fundamental criterion whether it is reasonably adapted to securing these in.
terests. . .

However often the Progressives ridiculed discussions of corporate "will" and
"personality" as a metaphysical inquiry derived from outmoded natural rights conceptions, they were not indifferent to whether the corporation should be treated
as a real entity. Here they stood together with earlier "realist" thinkers in insisting
that the recognition and protection of group interests was a "practical" necessity
of modern life. "The commercial world," wrote Henderson, "whose habits of
thought so largely influence the development of law, has come to regard the business
unit as the typical juristic entity, rather than the human being .... New economic

phenomena, railroads, industrial combinations, the emergence of hitherto disregarded
' 246
social classes, determine its growth.
It was the task of Realist legal thinkers to adjust legal conceptions to these
changes. For example, the earlier conception that the stockholders constitute the
corporation, Henderson wrote, "is of no value under modern conditions. The
modern stockholder is a negligible factor in the management of a corporation. ' 27
Standing behind the pragmatism of the Progressive view of corporations, then,
was an acceptance of the recent triumph of the corporate form as "a normal business
unit. ' 24 8 No longer was it necessary to resort to "metaphysics" to establish the
legitimacy of the business corporation. It had become a fait accompli.

"
2

Id. at 167.
d. at 165-66.

I,'at 165.
Id.
: Id. at 174.
2'5

Id.

116

Id. at 5,8.

"I

Id. at 169.

2,1Id.

at 3.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol88/iss2/5

50

19851

Horwitz: Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory
SANTA CLARA

IV.

CONCLUSION

The Santa Claracase did not represent the triumph of a "natural entity" theory
of the corporation. In 1886, when old conservatism still dominated the world view
of Supreme Court justices, any such conception of corporate personality would
have been received with hostility by a court still actively suspicious of corporate
power and the emergence of concentrated enterprise. The 1905 case of Hale v.
Henkel,2 49 underlines how late it was before the Supreme Court ambivalently began
the move towards a "natural entity" theory in corporate constitutional jurisprudence.
Its opinion that the search and seizure provisions of the fourth amendment apply
to the corporation while the fifth amendment's self-incrimination clause does not,
still wavers between the past and the future.
In Santa Clara a "natural entity" theory was unnecessary for the immediate
task of constitutionalizing corporate property rights. An "aggregate" or "partnership" or "contractual" vision of the corporation-with well established roots going
back to the Dartmouth College Case2 °0-was sufficient to focus the conceptual emphasis on the property rights of shareholders. Either a partnership or natural entity
view could equally successfully have subverted the dominant "artificial entity" view
of the corporation as a creature of the state.
If the choice between a "natural entity" and partnership theory was a toss-up
when Santa Clara was decided, other nonconstitutional considerations soon pushed
American legal theory towards the entity conception.
First, by 1900 it was no longer easy to conceive of shareholders as constituting
the corporation. Changes in the conception of the shareholder from active "owner"
to passive "investor" weakened the evocative power of partnership theory.
Moreover, the entity theory was better able to justify the weakened position of
the shareholders in internal corporate governance.
Second, the partnership theory represented a threat to the legitimacy of limited
liability of shareholders. The entity theory, by contrast, emphasized the distinction
between corporations and partnerships.
Third, while the partnership theory pushed in the direction of requiring
shareholder unanimity for corporate mergers, the entity theory made the justification of majority rule possible.
Fourth, the entity theory was superior to the partnership theory in undermining Chief Justice Taney's foreign corporation doctrine which represented a substantial legal threat to the emergence of national corporations doing business in each
of the states. The foreign corporation doctrine's reversal, shortly before World
War I, can be associated with the triumph of the entity theory.

Hale v. Henckel, 201 U.S. 43 (1905). See also cases cited supra note 46.
I" Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. (Wheat.) 518.
141
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Finally, let me now remind you of why, if I am correct, these conclusions are
important for general legal theory.
While it might be possible at some high level of abstraction divorced from
concrete social understandings to demonstrate that the partnership theory could
be manipulated to accomplish any of the legitimating tasks for which I have claimed
the natural entity theory was superior, in many of the specific historical contexts
I have identified the two conceptions of corporate personality did not have equal
evocative or persuasive power. Indeed, they carried with them considerable legal
and intellectual baggage that did not permit random deployment or infinite
manipulability.
While John Dewey may have been correct in identifying the contradictory or
random deployment of these conceptions as applied to labor unions and business
corporations, he could not, I believe, have successfully demonstrated that each theory
of corporate personality could have equally legitimated the practices of emergent
large scale business enterprise.
An important task of legal theory, then, is to uncover the specific historical
possibilities of legal conceptions-to "decode" their true concrete meanings in real
historical situations. We have spent much too much intellectual energy in the
increasingly sterile task of discussing legal theory in a historical vacuum. That is
one of the reasons why Anglo-American jurisprudence constantly seems to get no
further than repeated rediscoveries of the wheel. By contrast, in more specific settings, one finds that legal theory does powerfully influence the direction of legal
understanding.
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